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Don’t End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank Independence in an Age of Austerity 
Abstract 
The Federal Reserve (“Fed”) is the central bank of the United States. Because of 
its power and importance in guiding the economy, the Fed’s independence from direct 
political influence has made it a target of ideologically motivated attacks throughout its 
history, with an especially aggressive round of attacks coming in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis and ongoing today. We defend Fed independence. We point to the Fed’s 
exemplary performance during and after the 2008 crisis, and we offer the example of a 
potential future crisis in which Congress fails to increase the debt ceiling to show how the 
Fed’s independence makes it the only entity that can minimize the damage during crises 
(both market-driven and policy-induced). We further argue that the Fed’s independence is 
justified to prevent self-dealing by politicians, even when no crisis is imminent. Although 
the classic justification for Fed independence focuses on the risk that political actors will 
keep interest rates lower than appropriate for the long-term health of the economy, we 
show that Fed independence addresses the risk of self-dealing and other pathologies even 
when, as now, political actors favor tighter monetary policy than appropriate for the long-
term health of the economy. 
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Introduction
During the financial crisis of 2008 and for much of the deep recession that 
followed, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“the Fed”)1  took 
crucial steps to prevent the United States and the global economy from falling into a 
depression. Elected officials also acted. The Bush administration quickly devised the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”), which Congress first rejected but then 
enacted.2 In its first months in office, the Obama administration sought and obtained a 
substantial package of spending aimed at stimulating the economy.3 And building on 
efforts begun by President Bush, President Obama rescued the U.S. automobile industry 
by arranging for federal government-backed debtor-in-possession financing for General 
Motors.4 Yet these efforts were modest in scale relative to those of the Fed.5 Moreover, 
1 Congress established the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to serve as the central bank of the United 
States. The Fed’s key functions include formulating the country’s monetary policy, maintaining the 
stability of the financial system, containing systemic risks, regulating financial institutions, and providing 
various financial services to depository financial institutions and to the federal government. The Fed 
consists of a central, independent government agency (the Board of Governors), the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), and twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks. The Board of Governors and the FOMC 
effectuate monetary policy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
interest rates. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (LEXIS 2015); FED. RESERVE SYS., ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
FEDERAL RESERVE DIRECTORS 11 (2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/pdf/roles_responsibilities_FINALweb013013.pdf. 
2 The first version of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, debated in the House as H.R. 3997, 
was voted down 228-205 on September 29, 2009. See H.R. 3997, 110th Cong. (2008). A second version, 
H.R. 1424, passed the Senate on October 1, 2009 and the House 263-171 on October 3, 2009. See H.R. 
1424, 110th Cong. (2008) (creating TARP). 
3 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (LEXIS 2015). 
4 See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE 
DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg51964/html/CHRG-111shrg51964.htm; OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009 144-49 (2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/offices/Mgt/Documents/09AFR_Treasury_Tagged_07.pdf; PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON AUTOS, 
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION NEW PATH TO VIABILITY FOR GM & CHRYSLER 2–3, available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Fact_Sheet_GM_Chrysler_FIN.pdf; Brent J. Horton, The 
TARP Bailout of GM: A Legal, Historical, and Literary Critique, 14 TEX. REV. L & POL. 217, 249 (2010); 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the American Automotive Industry (Mar. 30, 2009) 
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-american-
automotive-industry-33009); Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Office of Pub. Affairs, GM Timeline, 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/GM%20Timeline.pdf; 
Secured Superpriority Debtor-in-Possession Agreement among General Motors Corporation, the 
Guarantors, and the Lenders (June 3, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-
programs/Documents/GM_Corporation_DIP_Loan_090909_new.pdf. 
5 Monetary policy was roughly an order of magnitude larger than fiscal policy. See generally CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
PANEL 162–64 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg64832/pdf/CHRG-
112shrg64832.pdf; OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
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after opposition led to a stimulus that was too small from the outset,6 politicians of both 
parties too quickly set their sights on deficit reduction.7 Tea Party-affiliated congressional 
Republicans repeatedly threatened not to raise the debt ceiling—and thus raised the 
specter of a first-ever default by the government of the United States—in order to obtain 
deep cuts in government spending.8 With the political system thus deploying fiscal policy 
at first too timidly and then counterproductively, it was left to the Fed to steer the 
economy through recovery via monetary policy. 
The Fed answered the call. In the early days of the crisis, the Fed interpreted its 
statutory mandate to permit bailouts of key firms,9 and for years thereafter the Fed kept 
real interest rates negative to flood the economy with essential liquidity.10  
SIG-QR-09-03, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 4, 38, 140, 152, 156 (2009), available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/July2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
6  See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Franklin Delano Obama?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/opinion/10krugman.html; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Let’s Get Fiscal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/opinion/17krugman.html;  Lawrence 
Summers, Op-Ed., Obama’s Stimulus Plan Must Aim for Long-Term Results, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/12/26/AR2008122601299.html?nav=hcmoduletmv. 
7 See Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, Testimony Before the Joint 
Econ. Comm. (June 21, 2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/testimony-chad-stone-chief-economist-
before-the-joint-economic-committee; Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Fin. 9 (Sept. 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.budget.senate.gov/democratic/public/_cache/files/d6d7d83d-55c4-47c3-a17b-
fe26d54e34f8/chad-stone---witness-testimony.pdf; Neil H. Buchanan, Good Deficits: Protecting the Public 
Interest from Deficit Hysteria, 31 VA. TAX REV. 75, 78 (2011); Neil H. Buchanan, Finally, Prominent 
Economists are Admitting That the Policy Debate Should not Focus on the Debt and Deficit: The Folly of 
Thinking Too Far Ahead, Verdict, JUSTICIA.COM, Jan. 31, 2013, 
https://verdict.justia.com/2013/01/31/finally-prominent-economists-are-admitting-that-the-policy-debate-
should-not-focus-on-the-debt-and-deficit; Jon Hilsenrath, Course of Economy Hinges on Fight over 
Stimulus, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2010,  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704720004575376923163437134 (quoting Rep. Paul 
Ryan rejecting the supposedly “false premise that only forceful and sustained government intervention in 
the economy can secure this country’s renewed prosperity.”); Christina Romer, Now Isn’t the Time to Cut 
the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/business/24view.html?_r=0. 
8 See Neil H. Buchanan & and Michael C. Dorf, Borrowing By Any Other Name: Why Presidential 
“Spending Cuts” Would Still Exceed the Debt Ceiling, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44, 51 (2014) 
[hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, Borrowing By Any Other Name];  Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Debt Ceiling: When Negotiating over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress 
and the President Should Consider the Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 32, 33 
(2013) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, 
Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat Once and for All: Why the President Should Embrace the Least 
Unconstitutional Option, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 237, 240 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, 
Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least 
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose]; Jonathan Weisman, 
Republicans Pledge New Standoff on Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/us/politics/gop-pledges-new-standoff-on-debt-limit.html?_r=0 
(reporting House Speaker John Boehner’s vow to oppose any increase in the debt ceiling unless it was 
offset by spending cuts). 
9 José Gabilondo, Financing Hospitals: Defending the Fed’s Role as a Market Maker of Last Resort, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 731, 783–85 (2013); Thomas O. Porter, II, Note & Comment, The Federal Reserve’s 
Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of the Federal Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 483, 485,
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Yet the Fed was not rewarded with anything like universal praise. On the 
contrary, in recent years, Fed critics on both the left and the right have issued calls to 
“end” or “audit” the Fed.11 The substantive criticisms include the following: The Fed 
exercises power in excess of its statutory mandate, as when it created special purpose 
vehicles to bail out troubled firms during the early days of the financial crisis;12 it creates 
money “out of thin air,” as when it pursued its policy of “quantitative easing” to stimulate 
the economy during the deep recession that followed that crisis;13  by design and in 
practice, it favors the interests of banks over the interests of less powerful firms and 
individuals; 14  and it tends to over-emphasize its inflation-fighting mandate over its 
employment-promoting mandate.15 Although critics on the left and right disagree about 
504 (2009); contra Chris Isidore, Why they Let Lehman Die, CNN MONEY, Sept. 15, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/15/news/companies/why_bear_not_lehman/. 
10 See generally Brett W. Fawley & Christopher J. Neely, Four Stories of Quantitative Easing, 95 FED.
RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 51 (2013), 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/13/01/Fawley.pdf. 
11 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2013, S. 209, 113th Cong. (2013); RON PAUL, END THE
FED (2009); MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42079, Federal Reserve: Oversight and 
Disclosure Issues 9–10 (2014); Chad Emerson, The Illegal Actions of the Federal Reserve: An Analysis of 
How the Nation’s Central Bank Has Acted Outside the Law in Responding to the Current Financial Crisis, 
1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 109, 133 (2010); Julie Hirschfeld & Davis Lisa Lerer, Romney Calls for 
Fed Audit as Party Mulls Platform Plank, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 20, 
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/romney-calls-for-fed-audit-as-party-mulls-platform-
plank.html.  
12 See, e.g., Arthur W.S. Duff, Central Bank Independence and Macroprudential Policy: A Critical Look 
at the U.S. Financial Stability Framework, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 212 (2014); Emerson, supra note 
11, at 129; Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve 
and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 236 (2010); but see Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 783–85; 
Porter, supra note 9, at 509. 
13 See, e.g., John Cochran, Fractional Reserve Banking and Central Banking as Sources of Economic 
Instability: The Sound Money Alternative, 11 INDIAN J. OF ECON. & BUS. 543, 544–545 (2012); Timothy C. 
Harker, Bailment Ailment: An Analysis of The Legal Status of Ordinary Demand Deposits in the Shadow of 
the Financial Crisis of 2008, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 543, 582 (2014) (arguing that the fractional 
reserve banking system is premised on the mischaracterization of bank deposits as loans instead of 
bailments, resulting in moral hazard and financial instability); Chris Isidore, Gingrich: U.S. Should 
Reconsider the Gold Standard, CNN MONEY, Jan. 18, 2012, 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/18/news/economy/gingrich_gold_standard/index.htm (promoting the gold 
standard). 
14  See DONALD KOHN, HUTCHINS CTR. ON FISCAL & MONETARY POLICY AT BROOKINGS, FEDERAL
RESERVE INDEPENDENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SHOULD WE BE WORRIED? (2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/01/16-federal-reserve-independence-
financial-crisis-kohn/16-federal-reserve-independence-financial-crisis-kohn.pdf (“The reach and extent of 
the lending was unprecedented, and it fostered a perception that Wall Street was being favored over Main 
Street.”); Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 792 (same); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance 
in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1625 
(2009) (“Critics argued . . . that the bill favored the rich[ . . . ]the investment banks, their managers, their 
shareholders[ . . . ]at the expense of the taxpayer, while providing no relief to distressed homeowners . . . 
.”); but cf. David Wessel, Inside Dr. Bernanke’s E.R., WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204271104574292094147841898 (quoting former Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke saying, “I care about Wall Street for one reason and one reason 
only: because what happens on Wall Street matters to Main Street.”). 
15 See Marc Labonte, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41656, CHANGING THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S MANDATE:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 (2013), http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/misc/R41656.pdf; Gabilondo, supra note 9, 
at  749–50; Michelle A. L. Goldberg, Note, The Fed’s Dual Mandate: One Too Many?, 33 REV. BANKING
6	
exactly what is wrong with the Fed’s substantive priorities and performance, they offer 
similar procedural critiques: the Fed, they complain, is politically unaccountable and 
opaque. 
Some of the foregoing criticisms are legitimate. 16  Furthermore, if the Fed 
deserves praise for its response to the 2008 crisis and its aftermath, it must also share the 
blame for creating the crisis in the first place. Although it appropriately maintained low 
interest rates to sustain a weak economy during the administration of George W. Bush17 it 
failed to provide the necessary oversight of systemically important financial institutions, 
which were especially in need of such oversight in a low-interest rate environment.18 
Nonetheless, even if some precisely targeted reforms of the Fed can be justified 
based on the experience of the recent past, calls to audit or end the Fed are quite 
misplaced. Although different in their details,19 at a minimum such proposals aim to 
& FIN. L. 343, 365 (citing former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Charles Schultze warning 
that full employment risks inflation); Daniel L. Thornton, The Dual Mandate: Has the Fed Changed Its 
Objective?, 94(2) FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 117, 117, 130 (2012), available at 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/12/03/117-134Thornton.pdf; Press Release, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm (arguing that employment is 
driven primarily by nonmonetary factors). 
16 But some are not. In particular, the contention that the Fed creates money out of thin air is an almost 
comically distorted description of how money comes into existence. Indeed, if one understands what 
money is and the role of a central bank, saying that money is created out of thin air is not a criticism but 
merely a colorfully misleading metaphor. See infra, Part I.  
17 The Fed’s low interest rate policy has been criticized from the political right, suggesting that low 
interest rates alone inexorably led to the housing bubble. See, e.g., Lawrence H. White, Federal Reserve 
Policy and the Housing Bubble, 29 CATO J. 115, 115–19 (2009); John B. Taylor, How Government 
Created the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123414310280561945. With appropriate oversight, however, there is no 
reason to think that low interest rates—which were justified as a macroeconomic policy matter—would 
have led to the mortgage crisis. 
18 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight 
and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (reporting former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan’s admission that he 
found a “flaw” in his economic philosophy and was “partially” wrong in “. . . presuming that the self-
interests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting 
their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.”)  See also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 52–66 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (noting the lack of effective regulation and 
the failure of federal officials to identify systemic risk); Bryan J. Orticelli, Note, Crisis Compounded by 
Constraint: How Regulatory Inadequacies Impaired the Fed’s Bailout of Bear Stearns, 42 CONN. L. REV.
647, 650–51 (2009) (arguing that fragmented regulatory authority contributed to the Fed’s inability to 
anticipate systemic risk). As Professor Omarova observes, the very power to exempt financial institutions 
from Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §371c (2006) (amended 2010), that some critics 
claim the Fed abused in bailing out firms, played a key role in creating the risky “shadow banking” regime 
in the lead-up to the crisis. See Saule T. Omarova, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: From 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of §23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 1683, 1702–29 (2011).  
19 Several bills have been proposed over the years calling for a full audit of the Fed Board of Governors 
and the Reserve Banks by the Comptroller General. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2015, 
S. 264, 114th Cong. (2015); Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 24, 114th Cong. (2015); 
Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2014, H.R. 24, 113th Cong. (2013); Federal Reserve Transparency 
Act of 2013, S. 209, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Audit the Fed Act of 2013, H.R. 33, 113th Cong. (2013) 
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curtail Fed independence, thus subjecting monetary policy to greater supervision by 
elected officials.20 
Subjecting the Fed to close political oversight would likely have harmful, perhaps 
even disastrous, consequences. Any country or, as in the case of the European Union, 
transnational political unit, that maintains its own currency, needs a central bank that is 
independent of close political oversight in order to ensure that politicians do not 
manipulate the monetary system for short-term political gain at the risk of inflicting long-
term economic damage. The classic worry is that incumbents will provide excessive 
economic stimulus in the months leading up to an election, even when the best economic 
analysis would call for tightening the spigot. 21  Accordingly, although the Fed is a 
creation of Congress rather than the Constitution itself, its independence can be justified 
with structural arguments similar to those typically offered to justify the independence of 
the Article III judiciary. Just as we cannot fully trust majoritarian politics to safeguard the 
constitutional rights of minorities, so we cannot trust venial politicians with incentives 
timed to the political cycle to set monetary policy timed to the business cycle, all the 
while keeping in mind longer-term goals of growth and stability. 
Ironically, however, in the current climate the harmful consequences of ending or 
auditing the Fed would not flow from the profligacy of politicians but from their foolish 
commitment to austerity. We need the Fed to be independent now in large part because 
subjecting it to close scrutiny by politically accountable actors would likely lead to 
unduly tight monetary policy. The Fed could no longer use monetary policy to counteract 
the baleful effects of ideologically driven tight fiscal policy. It would become part of the 
problem rather than part of the solution. Thus, even if the standard justification of the 
Fed’s independence envisions the Fed tilting against too-loose monetary preferences 
among politicians, from an economic perspective, that justification applies equally when 
(proposing reform of the manner in which the Comptroller General audits the Board of Governors). See 
also Bernie Sanders, To Rein in Wall Street, Fix the Fed, N.Y.TIMES A23 (Dec. 23, 2015) (“We need to . . . 
require the Government Accountability Office to conduct a full and independent audit of the Fed each and 
every year.”). 
20 Following convention, in this Article we refer to Fed “independence” simply to connote the fact that 
the Fed does not answer directly to the president or to Congress, but not to suggest that, as currently 
structured, outside actors, including political actors, have no influence on the Fed. If meant to imply some 
notion of pure economic expertise divorced from other constraints, we agree with Peter Conti-Brown’s 
assessment that “ ‘independence’ . . . is a concept without much analytical content.” PETER CONTI-BROWN, 
THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE xii (2016). As Conti-Brown explains, the very 
complexity of the Fed’s structure belies the image of the Fed as a single expert actor. See id. at 8 (“the Fed 
is one of the most organizationally complex entities in the federal government . . . [,] a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’ ”) 
We nonetheless find the term “independence” useful as a shorthand for the degree of autonomy from 
elected officials that the Federal Reserve system currently enjoys relative to typical federal agencies within 
the executive branch. 
21 Even as he deconstructs the concept of Fed independence, Conti-Brown provides a serviceable account 
of the standard justification for it: “Fed independence is the separation, by statute, of the central bankers 
(specifically the Fed Chair) and the politicians (specifically the president) for purposes of maintaining low 
inflation. [C]itizens in a democracy naturally prefer a prosperous economy. Politicians please us by giving 
us that prosperity, or at least trying to take credit for it. But when there is no prosperity to be had, 
politicians will resort to goosing the economy artificially by running the printing presses to provide enough 
money and credit for all. The short-term result is reelection for the politicians. The long-term result is 
worthless money that wreaks havoc on our economic, social, and political institutions.” Id. at 2. 
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politician’s preferences point in the opposite direction. Either way, the Fed serves as an 
important counterweight to politically motivated excess. 
Is this reversal of the standard justification for central bank independence merely 
ironic, or does it raise a deeper problem of democratic accountability? So long as we can 
point to structural reasons for Fed independence, we have an answer to whatever 
“counter-majoritarian difficulty” such independence raises.22 But if our best justification 
for Fed independence is that politicians frequently make bad economic decisions, then 
the argument for Fed independence has no logical stopping point. Politicians make bad 
decisions in many areas. They under-invest in infrastructure; they deny climate change; 
they subsidize industries that harm human health; they enact criminal laws that destroy 
the lives of nonviolent offenders and their families; and so forth. If the risk of merely 
sub-optimal policies emerging from the political process justifies lodging power in expert 
agencies subject to little or no political oversight, then there will be very little room for 
governance by elected officials. 
Can Fed independence be justified on grounds that do not also justify technocracy 
across the board? This Article argues that it can be. 
Even though we currently live in an age in which surprisingly large numbers of 
policy makers are committed to economic austerity, the classic worry that political actors, 
if given the chance, will loosen credit when they ought to tighten it, is real and could 
recur. Just as Vincent Blasi has argued that one ought to take a “pathological perspective” 
by designing constitutional rules governing free speech to protect against the worst of 
times, even if we usually live in good times,23 so too here, institutional design of our 
government institutions regarding the economy should be constructed for the long run. 
And in the long run, political actors have incentives to manipulate monetary policy—and 
to try to intimidate the Fed in an attempt to change regulatory outcomes—to their 
advantage. Even if one disagrees with our economic analysis, and approves of austerity, 
the Fed’s independence should be protected. 
Our point is not simply that political actors will slight the long-term health of the 
economy for short-term gains. After all, political actors have incentives to focus on the 
short run with respect to many policy areas. Under-investment in infrastructure results in 
part from the fact that the benefits of infrastructure projects are spread out over many 
years.24 Likewise, addressing environmental problems may require current sacrifices to 
benefit future generations. 25  If the shortsightedness of politicians were the only 
justification for Fed independence, then the argument really would amount to advocacy 
for technocracy tout court. 																																																								
22 Alexander Bickel coined the term “counter-majoritarian difficulty” to describe the uneasy place of 
judicial review in a basically democratic system. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 
16 (1962). We use it here deliberately, to associate Fed independence with judicial independence. 
23 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449 
(1985). 
24 Infrastructure projects do produce immediate benefits in the form of construction and ancillary jobs, 
but the distribution of these benefits is often distorted by political considerations. For example, the 
government may pour money into building a new bridge in a powerful House member’s district while 
neglecting needed rail improvements across many districts of less influential members. Moreover, the 
short-term benefits of infrastructure projects that are cost-justified in the long term may be smaller than the 
short-term benefits to current constituents of tax cuts or transfer payments. 
25 See generally Neil H. Buchanan, What Kind of Environment Do We Owe Future Generations? 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 339 (2011). 
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But political control of a central bank does not merely create a risk of shortsighted 
policy. It creates a risk of self-dealing of the same sort that, in other contexts, is thought 
to justify departures from majoritarianism in the name of constitutional democracy. We 
have already mentioned the independent judiciary as guarantor of minority rights as a 
constitutionally enshrined example of this sort of institutional design. There are also 
subconstitutional examples, such as the use of special prosecutors to investigate and 
prosecute high-ranking executive officials and the use of politically-independent election 
commissions or ostensibly neutral courts to supervise the election process. Although 
these kinds of institutions have been implemented imperfectly in the United States, they 
rest on some of the same basic logic that justifies an independent Fed: Incumbent elected 
officials ought not to be permitted to use the tools of government to gain unfair advantage 
in political contests. As John Hart Ely famously put the point in defending representation-
reinforcing judicial review, counter-majoritarianism is easiest to justify when it serves to 
prevent the “ins” from exploiting their position to stay “in.”26 
In addition, the sheer scale of the problems that a central bank must confront—
encompassing the entire economy and posing risks of catastrophe such as hyperinflation 
or depression—and the speed with which it must act in the face of an emergency, call for 
an institution that can respond with alacrity. It might be thought that, following the logic 
of Federalist No. 70, the “Energy in the Executive” permits the president to oversee a 
central bank that can respond to financial crises rapidly and effectively.27 But because of 
the need to calm markets in troubled times, the Fed’s policymaking board —indeed the 
Federal Reserve System as a whole—has sensibly been given policy independence, with 
political accountability ultimately deriving from the appointment and removal processes 
for Fed governors and regional bank presidents as well as Congress’s power (which it has 
thus far wisely chosen not to exercise) to change the statutory mandate of the Fed 
(indeed, to dismantle the Fed entirely) at any time, subject to the reactions of the public 
and the financial markets to any meddling with the Fed’s historical mandate and 
powers.28 Indeed, as we explain at greater length below, in general and in times of crisis, 
the Fed’s status as an entity that is not really a part of any of the three branches of 
government enables it to act as an independent counter-party to transactions with the 
more directly presidentially accountable (and thus politically manipulable) Treasury 
Department. 
Although it is possible to imagine some of the current regulatory responsibilities 
of the Fed being reallocated to more directly accountable government agencies, 
independence contributes substantially to its ability to perform its key function as a 
central bank. As we argue in Part I, moreover, the interactions between the Fed’s 
regulatory responsibilities and its mandate to conduct monetary policy writ large make 
sense of the Fed’s current, broad portfolio. 
This Article examines and responds to critiques of Fed independence in four 
parts. Part I presents a brief schematic overview of the structure and powers of the Fed. 
Part II catalogues the main criticisms of the Fed, distinguishing those that, if valid, could 
be addressed by modest statutory changes, from those that fundamentally challenge Fed 
independence. Part III explains how the Fed used its powers during the 2008 financial 																																																								
26 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 101–04 (1980). 
27 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
28 See supra note 1. 
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crisis and its aftermath to stabilize the economy, and how it might play an essential role 
in rescuing the economy in the event that the United States finds itself unable to pay its 
bills due to debt ceiling brinksmanship. Part IV then elaborates the argument for Fed 
independence even in an era of austerity, explaining how an independent central bank fits 
in the overall constitutional design. We conclude by identifying a connection between 
contemporary anxiety about Fed independence and a longstanding but deeply problematic 
strain of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian populism dating to the earliest days of the American 
Republic. 
I. An Independent Central Bank: The Structure and Powers of the Federal 
Reserve 
 
The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States. Like the Bank of 
England, the Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank (as well as the national 
central banks that the latter institution replaced, including the Bundesbank and the 
Banque de France), the Federal Reserve was created to control the levers of monetary 
policy, most importantly including setting interest rates (and thus controlling the supply 
of money). In turn, these responsibilities for carrying out monetary policy at the 
macroeconomic level require that it have significant regulatory powers over the banking 
system. 
The roots of the Fed date back to the earliest years of the Republic. The First 
Bank of the United States—the earliest predecessor to the Fed—served a number of vital 
functions, but it was not a central bank in the modern sense. In any event, its charter 
expired in 1811, leaving the United States without a nationally chartered bank until 1816, 
when the Second Bank of the United States was created.29 In the intervening period, the 
United States nearly lost the War of 1812, partly because its efforts were severely 
hampered by the lack of enthusiasm of state-chartered private banks for providing credit 
to the federal government.30 Consequently, following the war, President James Madison, 
whose Jeffersonian Republican Party had previously opposed the Bank, signed into law 
the bill creating the Second Bank of the United States.31 A few years later, Chief Justice 
John Marshall pithily alluded to this history in McCulloch v. Maryland, when he wrote 
that “a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive [the First 
Bank] exposed the Government convinced those who were most prejudiced against the 
measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the” law chartering the Second 
Bank.32 
Nonetheless, President Andrew Jackson vetoed legislation that would have 
renewed the Second Bank’s charter, offering populist and xenophobic reasons.33 In the 
nearly eight decades between the cessation of operations of the Second Bank and the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve, the federal government continued to develop a 
system to regulate banks. For example, during and after the Civil War, Congress passed a 																																																								
29 See RALPH C.H. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1903). 
30 See id. (“The Second Bank of the United States owed its origin to the disasters of the war of 1812”). 
31 See id. at 21 (noting that Madison signed the bill after vetoing a similar one the previous year). 
32 17 U.S. 316, 402 (1819). 
33  President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 18, 1832), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp.  
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series of banking statutes,34  which were most directly aimed at allowing the federal 
government to borrow money to finance the war effort, but which also established a 
national currency, created a national banking system, set up a system to regulate 
commercial banks, and enacted other important regulatory and policy innovations.35 At 
the same time, however, the lack of a federal central bank left the states to regulate 
banking in parallel with the much weaker federal regulatory system. The monetary 
system changed and largely improved over time, but the progress was halting and 
sporadic. 
The history of this period is, not coincidentally, littered with periodic financial 
crises (then called “panics”), which bled over from Wall Street to Main Street and 
became severe economic depressions. Among the worst of these were the Panic of 1873 
and the Panic of 1907, the latter of which finally moved Congress to create a central bank 
for the United States, which came into being in 1913. 
Even though the political climate in 1913 finally allowed the creation of a central 
bank for the United States, Jacksonian distrust of centralized financial power remained a 
potent force. In particular, the popular appeal of political figures such as William 
Jennings Bryan was based in large part on the public’s fear of Wall Street and worries 
about the power of banks over people’s lives. As a result, the country’s new central bank 
was not called “The Bank of the United States,” or “The Central Bank of America.” 
Instead, President Wilson chose the anodyne name “Federal Reserve System.” That 
political sensitivity carried over from the naming of the central bank to the creation of a 
rather byzantine structure. 
A. The Structure of the Federal Reserve 
 
Given the fear of centralizing financial power in New York or Washington, the 
new Federal Reserve System was created to give the appearance of a nationwide 
structure, based on what looks like a confederation of twelve regional Federal Reserve 
banks.36 Although they would be part of the federal government, these regional banks 
were located in important cities across the country, generally reflecting regional 
population patterns in 1913.37 
However, had those regional banks been an important part of the policymaking 
apparatus (or, for that matter, if they had even been helpful in connecting local economies 
with the central bank), one would have expected to see the creation of more regional 
federal reserve banks as the economic and demographic centers of gravity in the United 
States moved westward. Instead, more than a century after its creation, the same twelve 
Federal Reserve Banks continue to operate, and no new banks have come into existence. 
It is particularly notable that the only Federal Reserve regional bank in the western half 																																																								
34 The National Banking Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); The National Banking Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 
(1863). See also Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. at Large, 98, 146-47. 
35 The very brief historical summary in this paragraph and the next two are common knowledge. For a 
good introduction, see generally ROGER T. JOHNSON, HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS . . . THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
(Mary J. Coyle et al.eds., 2010). 
36 The regional banks are located in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, 
Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco. The Twelve Federal Reserve 
Districts, THE FED. RESERVE BD., http://www.federalreserve.gov/otherfrb.htm . 
37  KEVIN D. HOOVER, APPLIED INTERMEDIATE MACROECONOMICS 625 (2012). 
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of the United States is in San Francisco, even as regional banks continue to operate in, for 
example, Richmond, Cleveland, and Kansas City.38 
The only policymaking power bestowed on regional banks is through their 
representation on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). 39  That committee 
includes all twelve presidents of the regional banks, only five of whom have voting 
powers at any given time.40 By contrast, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System consists of seven presidential appointees, each serving fourteen-year terms.41 The 
President appoints one of those governors as the chairperson of the Fed, for a four-year 
renewable term, subject to confirmation by the Senate.42 
The real policymaking power in the Federal Reserve, then, resides in the Board of 
Governors, which is located in Washington. Although the regional presidents vote on the 
FOMC, they are, by design, outnumbered by the presidentially appointed governors of 
the system. Effectively, therefore, the Fed is run as a central bank, from the nation’s 
capital. 
B. The Powers of the Federal Reserve 
 
Even as the United States was hampered by the frequent panics in the pre- 
Fed period, the country was emerging as a global economic power. Accordingly, the 
Fed’s designers sought to construct an institution with powers commensurate to the 
nation’s role in the global economy. They bestowed upon it powers that would allow the 
Fed to intervene when necessary to prevent the financial system from spinning out of 
control. Financial stability is its central concern. 
The Fed is commonly referred to as the “lender of last resort” to signify that the 
Fed will lend money to key financial players when private sector actors cannot or will not 
do so, and when the financial system cannot otherwise withstand the disruption that 
would come from the collapse of a systemically important institution. The financial 
system occasionally comes under severe pressure and is in danger of collapse, because 
banks or other financial institutions unexpectedly find themselves short of funds needed 
to continue operating. For example, if a large bank were to announce an unexpected loss 
or other worrying news, other banks (in what is known as a “contagion effect”) could find 
that their depositors withdraw more funds from their accounts than they would otherwise 
wish to withdraw, simply as a matter of caution. This can then create a series of “runs” on 
banks, all of which need more money on hand than usual to prevent default. None of 
those institutions would necessarily have engaged in any unwise behavior that would 																																																								
38 The regional banks have opened some “branch” banks in major cities such as Miami (a branch of 
Atlanta’s regional Fed), see The Atlanta Fed, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA,  
https://www.frbatlanta.org/about/atlantafed.aspx,  and Los Angeles (a branch of San Francisco’s), see Our 
History, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., http://www.frbsf.org/our-district/about/our-history/, but those 
operations are entirely devoted to the most mundane of tasks. Certainly, no policy decisions are made even 
at the regional bank level, much less at the branch level.  
39 See G. THOMAS WOODWARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 96-672 E, MONEY AND THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM: MYTH AND REALITY (1996), http://home.hiwaay.net/~becraft/FRS-myth.htm. 
40 See id.  
41  Board Members, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/default.htm. 
42 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2015). 
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have precipitated the crisis, but all are in danger of collapse because of the interconnected 
nature of the financial system. 
Any such situation poses risks for the real economy as well, because even the 
most basic operations of a modern business rely on the availability of ready credit. 
Businesses typically pay their suppliers and employees on a predictable (and legally 
enforceable) schedule, rather than having to wait until their accounts receivable actually 
become cash in hand, because those businesses have relationships with banks that smooth 
out cash flows. Moreover, when banks begin to pull back on loans that would have 
financed other businesses’ expansions, or when fewer home mortgages are offered, and 
so on, the effects cascade onto those whose transactions are contingent on the original 
loan being completed. (For example, the sellers of House A cannot buy their dream house 
B unless the buyer of House A receives the loan necessary to close the deal. If that deal 
falls through, the seller of House B is similarly unable to proceed with her plans to buy 
House C, and so on.) 
These risks are inherent in any financial system, because every creditor-debtor 
relationship is predicated on the ability of the rest of the financial system to provide flows 
of funds to enable business to be transacted. Therefore, the lender-of-last-resort role of 
the Federal Reserve is fundamental to its effectiveness as the primary regulator of the 
U.S. financial system.43 
Giving the Fed the power to lend money wherever and whenever needed to 
prevent a crisis, however, necessarily raises two related questions. First, where does the 
Fed get the money necessary to inject into the financial system when it is needed? And 
second, if the Fed can put new money into the system at will, might the Fed not run the 
risk of creating too much money, thus raising the possibility that it would inadvertently 
set off an inflationary spiral?44 
The answer to the first question—where does the money come from? —is 
counterintuitive but ultimately unavoidable in any economy that is not simply a barter 
system. Every government, whether or not it nominally ties its currency to a commodity 
such as gold or silver, and whether or not it creates a central bank, ultimately has the 
power to create money where money did not exist before. Certainly, every central bank 
must have that power in order to fulfill its central role as lender of last resort, or else it 
too would be powerless to break out of the market contagions and other threats that arise 
in the financial system. When everyone else is pulling back, the central bank must be able 
to extend itself and do what others cannot or will not do. 																																																								
43  It is especially notable that the European Central Bank (ECB), which was created in 1999 in 
conjunction with the euro, was not formally given the power to act as the lender of last resort for its 
member countries and banks. The series of European financial crises over the last several years ultimately 
led the ECB’s chairman to declare that his institution would do “whatever it takes” to bring stability to the 
Eurozone’s financial system. This announcement that the ECB was taking on the lander-of-last-resort role 
calmed the markets almost immediately. Although many problems remain in Europe, the ECB’s decision to 
act more like the Fed was a major step forward. See generally, Gerhard Illing and Phillip Konig, The 
European Central Bank as a Lender of Last Resort, DIW ECON. BULLETIN (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.488640.de/diw_econ_bull_2014-09-3.pdf. 
44  Although it is beyond the scope of this article, we note here that there is anything but a direct 
connection between the creation of money and inflation, much less between money growth and 
hyperinflation. See generally, Paul Krugman, Way Off Base, N.Y.TIMES, (Oct. 7, 2011 3:15 PM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/way-off-base-2/?_r=0.  
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As a technical matter, the Fed can create money simply by buying assets from 
private and government actors, with those actors accepting a check from the Fed. Why 
does the counter-party accept a check from the Fed? Because it is a check from the Fed, 
and the Fed is the guarantor of money. Money is, ultimately, an exercise in group 
psychology.45 The Fed thus creates money by “injecting” newly created funds into the 
financial system, in so doing accumulating assets on its balance sheet, which are matched 
on the liability side by the Fed’s legal requirement to stand behind its money, that is, the 
dollars that it has created.46 
The second question noted above—If the Fed can create money at will, how can 
we guarantee that it will not create too much money? —raises the key issue underlying 
all of modern monetary policy. The answer, however, is generally provided not by having 
the Fed concern itself directly with the number of dollars that it has created (although it 
certainly keeps close track of all such “monetary aggregates”), but with the indirect effect 
that its asset purchases have on interest rates. That is, when the Fed buys (and sometimes 
sells) government bonds, it can make the prices of those bonds go up or down. Because 
the interest rates on bonds are inversely related to the bonds’ prices, the Fed can directly 
target interest rates for government bonds.47 For example, if the Fed believes that the 
interest rate is too low, it can sell bonds, pushing down the price of those bonds and thus 
pushing up their interest rate.48 
Although the Fed can also adjust other levers of monetary policy (changing the 
interest rate on loans that it makes directly to commercial banks,49 as well as changing the 
rules that allow commercial banks to turn deposits into loans50), the Fed carries out its 
monetary policy power role almost exclusively through its purchases and sales of 
government bonds through “open market operations.” Those operations allow the Fed to 
control interest rates, and (as noted above) concomitantly determine how much money 
the Fed creates. 
Together, these mechanisms enable the Fed to create as much money as is 
necessary to keep the economy healthy, and no more. The Federal Reserve Act requires 
the Fed to engage in policies to promote “stable prices,” which means that if the Fed 
needs to create money to avert a crisis (through its key role as lender of last resort), it 																																																								
45  See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Money Is Magic, DORF ON LAW (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/02/money-is-magic.html. 
46 If a person presents a dollar—a “Federal Reserve Note” —for payment, the Fed is obligated to pay that 
person in dollars. That is, the obligation to “honor its debts” is simply a requirement that the Fed pay 
dollars for dollars. It is thus easy to understand why there is persistent confusion and cynicism about the 
role of central banks. Even though the system can be inherently stable, it is all too easy to describe it as a 
shell game. 
47 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL AND ALAN S. BLINDER, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 249-
287 (6th ed. 2006). 
48 Although we refer to “the interest rate” as if there were only one such rate, there are obviously many 
rates that are available at any given time, including credit card rates, mortgage rates, corporate bond rates, 
state and local bond rates, and federal Treasury bond rates. The interest rate that the Fed directly targets is 
called the Fed Funds Rate, which is the rate on overnight loans between banks. This rate is not directly 
important for consumer and business transactions, but other rates tend to rise or fall in concert with the Fed 
Funds Rate. We discuss so-called Quantitative Easing in Part II below, which is a program in which the 
Fed tries to move the interest rates on longer-term securities. 
49 This is called the discount rate. 
50 The Fed has the power to set “reserve requirements,” which determine how much money banks must 
keep “on reserve” to meet daily cash requirements, rather than lending the money for profit. 
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must continually ensure that its pre- and post-crisis actions recalibrate the setting of 
interest rates and the creation of money to keep the economy from overheating and thus 
igniting inflation. 
Importantly, however, the Federal Reserve Act requires the Fed (acting through 
the FOMC) to do more than guard against the possibility that inflation will get out of 
control. The Fed must also “promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”51 That is, in addition to worrying 
about inflation (which, again, means worrying about interest rates being too low), the Fed 
must also attempt to balance concerns about inflation with concerns about 
unemployment. One sure way to keep prices low, after all, would be to push up interest 
rates, but that would lead to increases in unemployment. By law, however, the Fed must 
strike a reasonable balance between inflation and unemployment. 
What constitutes such a reasonable balance? Congress spoke to this issue with the 
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978,52 in which it specified that the 
President should aim for zero percent inflation and three percent unemployment from 
1988 onward.53 Congress further instructed the Fed to coordinate its monetary policy 
with the President’s policy, thus at least committing the Fed to those goals at one step of 
remove. 
In practice, however, those goals have never been met. The unemployment rate 
briefly dipped below four percent during 2000, but it has never reached three percent, and 
it has averaged above five percent even in non-recessionary years. 54  Similarly, the 
inflation rate has been generally positive (though still quite low) throughout this period. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Fed several years ago announced a policy goal of two 
percent inflation—not as a maximum, but as a specific target —based on economic 
research suggesting that there are needlessly high costs to trying to achieve zero inflation, 
and that a stable higher target would afford the Fed greater latitude in responding to 
crises.55 
Even though the specific targets in the 1978 law have not been achieved (and 
might not even be achievable), the Fed is still required to engage in a balancing act, 
applying its delegated power to set interest rates and to regulate the financial system to 
minimize both inflation and unemployment.56  Disagreements about the relative weights 																																																								
51 12 USC § 225a (2000). 
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3152 (2015) (also known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act). 
53  Richard Karlgaard, The 10%-10k Conundrum, FORBES (Nov. 12, 2009 5:22 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/digitalrules/2009/11/12/the-10-10k-conundrum/  
54   See Unemployment rate in the United States from 1990 to 2014, STATISTICA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/193290/unemployment-rate-in-the-usa-since-1990/. Note that the annual 
unemployment rate in 2000 was four percent, but for five months of that year it was slightly below that 
figure, as can be verified using government labor statistics with the tool available at 
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000. 
55  R.A, Why the Fed Targets 2% Inflation Rate, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 2015 11:21 AM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/09/economist-explains-7. As we noted above, 
the “real” interest rate has been negative recently. But because the real rate is the difference between 
nominal interest rates and the inflation rate, a higher rate of inflation would have allowed the Fed to reduce 
real interest rates even further than it was able to in a lower-inflation environment. 
56 Note that, even though the Federal Reserve Act specifies “price stability” as a goal of the Fed, see 
What are the Federal Reserve’s objectives in conducting monetary policy?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12848.htm, that does not necessarily 
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that the Fed has put on unemployment versus inflation have fueled some of the criticisms 
of the Fed that we describe in Part II below. 
Indeed, some critics of the Fed believe that it should have no policy discretion at 
all, and that the Fed should instead become nothing more than the employer of a group of 
technicians who enact a mechanical monetary rule that is set in law by Congress. We next 
explain why the Fed should not only continue to be given the latitude to adjust policy by 
applying its reasoned judgment, but that such judgment will be best exercised in an 
environment where the Fed is largely protected from direct influence by political actors. 
C. Why Is the Federal Reserve Independent, and What Does That Entail? 
 
As we explained in the preceding sub-Part, the Federal Reserve’s raison d’être 
(based on what might be thought of as its “origin story” in the aftermath of the series of 
financial panics in the 19th  and early 20th centuries) creates a series of related 
imperatives in the Fed’s structure and policy goals. Because the Fed must be able to 
prevent financial crises, it must be able to provide “liquidity” —that is, to create new 
money—when the various actors in the financial system simultaneously engage in self-
protecting (and individually rational) actions that could create catastrophic cascading 
effects. But if the Fed is to be the lender of last resort, it must be mindful that its 
emergency lending activities can have effects on the money supply and perforce on 
interest rates. Thus, in order to do its primary job —to prevent financial and economic 
crises—the Fed must either coordinate with some other (already-extant or hypothetical) 
agency that is setting money supply and interest rates on a non-emergency basis, or the 
Fed itself must be given the power to control the money supply and interest rates in both 
good times and bad. As a practical matter, even if those roles were separated, the two 
agencies would need to act effectively as one in order to follow their respective and 
related policy mandates. And once Congress has given the Fed control over monetary 
policy in general, it makes sense that the Fed should consider the effects of its policy 
choices not just on inflation but on unemployment, growth, and other economic policy 
goals as well. 
Having said all of that, however, there is nothing in our account to this point that 
would require a central bank to be politically independent. That is, the power to create 
and control the monetary system, which in the United States is an enumerated power of 
Congress, 57  could be directly carried out by Congress itself, as part of its ongoing 
legislative agenda. Just as Congress has not created a politically insulated board to 
control fiscal policy (taxing and spending),58 it could decide that it wants to take regular 
votes on monetary policy issues, setting interest rates directly or indirectly by majority 
votes in both houses of Congress (subject to the usual Article I, Section 7 rules of 
presidential vetoes and overrides). Although members of Congress generally possess no 
expertise in monetary policy, our system of governance does not require expertise, but 
only democratic representation. 																																																																																																																																																																					
require the inflation rate to be zero. Prices can rise at a predictable rate and be “stable” in a meaningful 
sense. 
57 U.S. CONST. Art I. § 8 (“The Congress shall have the power to coin money, regulate the value 
thereof”). 
58 But see Neil H. Buchanan, Good Deficits: Protecting the Public Interest from Deficit Hysteria, 31 VA. 
TAX REV. 75, 126-127 (2011) (proposing that Congress create a “fiscal Fed”). 
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Congress has wisely concluded, however, that its lack of expertise in monetary 
policy is good reason to delegate its authority to an expert body. Even so, the various 
duties that the Fed currently carries out, especially the highly essential function of setting 
interest rates that we described in sub-Part I.B above, could in principle be delegated to 
the executive branch. The Treasury Department already bears responsibility for creating 
physical coins and currency,59 and it also carries out various delegated functions of fiscal 
policy, including borrowing funds to finance federal budget deficits (as we discuss in Part 
III below). Congress could thus further delegate to Treasury or some other executive 
branch agency the authority not only to implement aspects of monetary policy but to 
formulate it as well, so long as Congress complied with the minimal requirement of 
articulating some “intelligible principle” to guide the agency.60 
Running monetary policy through either of the political branches, however, would 
leave open the possibility that the vicissitudes of electoral politics could lead to monetary 
policy decisions that are keyed to short-term political gains, leading to short-term 
economic volatility and threatening to undermine longer-term stability and growth. 
Indeed, the classic argument in favor of a politically insulated monetary authority, as 
noted in the Introduction, has always been based on the concern that political actors 
would tend to create too much money, thus risking ever-rising inflation. History is 
littered with examples of exactly this kind of catastrophe.61 
As we describe in Parts III and IV, moreover, this is not the only possible reason 
to set up the monetary authority as a politically independent agency. Especially in the 
current political environment, it turns out that the Fed can act as an appropriate counter-
balance against political winds that would slow the economy down. 
In any event, the current structure of the Federal Reserve creates the kind of 
policy independence that we think is now more important than ever. Although we 
recognize that independence is a matter of multi-dimensional degree rather than a simple 
on/off proposition,62 we think it clear that along the most relevant dimensions, the Fed 
counts as relatively independent, rather than relatively accountable to the president or to 
Congress. The terms of the Fed’s governors are long (fourteen years) and staggered, so 
that no single president is likely to be able to reshape the Fed’s policy preferences on a 
																																																								
59  See Coins and Currency, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/services/Pages/coins-currency.aspx . 
60 E.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Such an intelligible principle could, in fact, look exactly 
like the current Federal Reserve Act’s requirement to strive for maximum employment, price stability, and 
moderate interest rates. “Intelligible” need not mean “specific.” 
61 In America, the Revolutionary War era saw money being created at such a rate that the term “not 
worth a Continental” – referring to the currency of the Continental Congress) – entered the popular lexicon. 
See The Revolutionary War to the War of 1812, TAX ANALYSTS, 
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/Web/THM1777?OpenDocument (Dec. 22, 2015). . Interwar 
Germany is another famous example of a country that experienced hyper-inflation (and a serious 
depression) that led to catastrophic political and human consequences. See Mamta Badkar, 10 
Hyperinflation Horror Stories of the 20th Century, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2011 10:09 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/10-hyperinflation-stories-of-the-20th-century-2011-3?op=1. In the 1980s, 
Argentina experienced extreme hyper-inflation that rose to 12,000% in 1989. See id.  
62 See text accompanying notes 153-163, infra. 
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wholesale basis.63 And even if the president could do so, he would not be able to demand 
the resignations of Fed governors who subsequently act contrary to the president’s 
immediate preferences. 
Similarly, the other voting members of the FOMC are presidents of the regional 
Federal Reserve Banks. The selection process for regional bank presidents involves even 
less direct input from the political branches. Although we agree with critics who suggest 
that the regional presidents should also be presidentially appointed (and, like the Fed’s 
governors, subject to confirmation by the Senate),64  the FOMC under either system 
possesses the ability to act independently. Voting in an unpopular way cannot result in 
firing or censure. 
Even so, the Fed can still fairly be described as accountable in an important sense. 
All of the voting members have undergone rigorous public vetting, and all of them have 
reason to be judicious in making policy choices, because they are under intense scrutiny 
at all times. Moreover, everyone knows that the Federal Reserve exists by act of 
Congress, and that Congress could at any time change the degree of independence under 
which the Fed operates, including shutting it down entirely. Reining in the Fed in that 
way is rightly controversial, and it is understood that efforts to make even moderate 
changes to the Fed (or to the rules governing monetary policy more generally) should be 
undertaken with great care, because of the possible effects of such momentous changes 
on financial markets and the broader economy. Indeed, we argue throughout this Article 
that the Fed ought not be made substantially more accountable than it currently is. Even 
so, the Fed is always on notice that it is not truly free to act only on its own judgment. By 
contrast with members of the federal judiciary, whose life tenure and salary protection 
could not be eliminated except by a constitutional amendment, the Fed’s independence 
could be modified or revoked by ordinary legislation. 
In addition, Congress has required that the Fed’s chair testify regularly before the 
relevant committees of the House and Senate, which gives the Fed and Congress the 
opportunity to engage in (sometimes highly contentious) public exchanges about policy 
goals. 
In these very important senses, therefore, the Fed is “politically accountable but 
policy independent.”65  This policy independence, however, is currently under attack. 
Implementing the critics’ proposals to undermine Fed independence would harm the 
Fed’s ability to act as a necessary counter-weight to other policymakers, especially 
during a real or potential crisis, as we describe below in Parts III and IV. Before coming 
to those arguments, in Part II we summarize the proposals of the Fed’s critics. 
																																																								
63 The possibility of early resignations, of course, can create simultaneous appointment opportunities for 
a president. Even so, a president’s ability to change monetary policy through the appointments process is 
by design much more limited than his ability to control policy made through more directly accountable 
agencies. 
64  See Peter Conti-Brown, Op-Ed., To Fix the Fed, Simplify it, N.Y. TIMES, (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/opinion/to-fix-the-fed-simplify-it.html. 
65 See id.  
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II. Criticisms of the Federal Reserve 
 
Proposals to “end” or “audit” the Fed come from critics on both the right and the 
left. In some respects the various critiques converge, but they also differ on key points. 
Perhaps more important than sorting conservative from progressive critiques of the Fed is 
the task of sorting along another axis: between those critiques that, if credited as fair, 
could be addressed by relatively minor statutory amendments and those that pose a 
challenge to Fed independence with respect to its fundamental role in making monetary 
policy decisions, to act as a lender of last resort, and to coordinate its regulatory role with 
its policymaking role. This Part briefly describes the leading objections with an eye to 
this latter dichotomy. Because we conclude that some of the criticisms, if credited, really 
would set the stage for seriously curtailing Fed independence, we turn in the subsequent 
Parts to underscoring the practical and theoretical grounds for supporting such 
independence. 
A. Statutory Authority 
 
During and after the 2008 financial crisis, various critics complained that the Fed 
acted beyond its statutory authority. The most common complaint was that the Fed 
created dummy entities in order to purchase private assets that it lacked the power to 
purchase directly. This criticism tends to focus on the bailouts of two systemically 
important financial institutions: Bear Stearns (in the lead-up to the crisis); and AIG (at the 
height of the crisis). The critics argue that while the Fed has the emergency power to 
extend credit on favorable terms,66 the power of the Fed (and the regional banks in the 
Federal Reserve System) to purchase assets generally extends only to government-issued 
instruments, 67  with such powers as the Fed does have to purchase private assets 
circumscribed by collateral requirements, time limits, and other constraints.68 According 
to one critic, in creating special-purpose vehicles to bail out Bear Stearns and AIG, “the 
Fed attempted to use legal trickery to disguise its illegal purchases of private assets from 
these companies,” and thus “acted outside the scope of its statutory authority by 
effectively purchasing assets that did not fall within the narrow purchase authority 
provided by the Federal Reserve Act.”69 Other commentators draw similar conclusions.70 
Are the critics right? Were the Bear and AIG bailouts illegal? We think the 
answer is not entirely clear-cut. We agree that the transactions were loans in form but 
purchases in substance. Yet it does not obviously follow that they were illegal. The law 
sometimes disregards form in favor of function, but not always. Moreover, at the relevant 
time, no statutory provision expressly forbade the Fed from using its lending authority to 
accomplish de facto purchases. The argument for finding in the Federal Reserve Act a 
tacit prohibition on asset purchases rests on the assumption that if Congress meant to 																																																								
66 See Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
67 See Federal Reserve Act § 14(b), 12 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). 
68 See 12 U.S.C. § 344 (2006) (authorizing secured purchase of bills of exchange backed by certain non-
perishable agricultural products, provided the assets are held by the Fed for no longer than ninety days). 
69 Emerson, supra note 11 at 128. 
70 See, e.g., Mehra, supra note 12 at 235–36 (arguing that the Fed disguised forbidden purchases as 
authorized loans); Duff, supra note 12 at 202 n.59 (describing how the Fed circumvented the limits on its 
purchase authority). 
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delegate purchase authority to the Fed it would have done so expressly, because where 
Congress did delegate such authority, it came with limits. Silence in this context, goes the 
argument, is a denial of authority. 
Nonetheless, two factors point in the other direction. First, the very idea of 
emergency lending authority connotes some flexibility. Part of what makes an emergency 
an emergency is the fact that prior actions did not or could not prepare for the existing 
circumstances. Thus, one might think that emergency authority should be treated as 
sufficiently elastic to meet the pressing needs of the moment. As Adam Levitin explains, 
while it is true that the Fed’s lending authority was envisioned as authorizing measures to 
provide liquidity rather than to ensure the solvency of particular firms, during crises 
(including the last crisis), the line between liquidity and solvency blurs.71 
Second, as Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule note, even if the best reading of the 
statutes would render the Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts unlawful, standard 
administrative law doctrine grants to agencies the power to adopt a reasonable 
construction of the statutes they administer, even if that construction is not the 
construction that a court would give the statutes considering the matter de novo.72 They 
acknowledge that the AIG bailout was “a loan in form” but “a purchase in substance.” 
Nonetheless, they conclude that “[a] court might find that, in the circumstances, the Fed’s 
implicit interpretation of the statute to permit purchases of distressed nonbank firms in 
emergency conditions was reasonable.”73 
We think it is, at the very least, uncertain whether the Fed’s bailouts of Bear 
Stearns and AIG were legal. However, even if one is persuaded that the Fed acted beyond 
its statutory authority, and thus illegally, that does not necessarily point to any systemic 
problem calling for a systemic remedy. The argument that the Fed’s actions were legal is 
at least non-frivolous, and it should hardly come as a surprise that agencies occasionally 
assert powers beyond their statutory mandates. When an agency does so, absent judicial 
intervention, the proper remedy is for Congress to clarify prospectively that the agency 
either possesses or lacks the relevant power. 
Here Congress chose the latter course. Section 1101(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act74 
amended section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act to clarify that henceforward any Fed 
“program or facility that is structured to remove assets from the balance sheet of a single 
and specific company” is ineligible for the sort of emergency lending that the Fed used in 
combination with the creation of a special purpose vehicle during the financial crisis.75 
Whether that was the right judgment is also uncertain. If one thinks, as we do, that 
the Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts were important measures to stabilize the economy, 																																																								
71  After acknowledging that Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act was not intended as a bailout 
mechanism, Levitin explains that “the difficulty that the Fed encountered when dealing with AIG was that 
liquidity and solvency support bled into each other.” Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 
435, 498 (2011). Moreover, quite apart from technical considerations, Levitin cautions that “binding 
ourselves to eschew [lender-of-last-resort] behavior [by our central bank] would amount to an economic 
suicide pact.” Id. at 499. 
72 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (announcing the presumption that 
Congress delegates authority to the agencies it has created to interpret legal questions that cannot be 
resolved by “traditional tools of statutory interpretation”).  
73 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14. 
74 Pub.L. 111-203, Title XI, § 1101(a), 124 Stat. 2113 (2010). 
75 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(B)(iii) (2010). 
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then one would want to clarify that the Fed has the tools to take similar measures in the 
event of a future crisis. However, viewed ex ante, one might think that by clearly denying 
the Fed the power to relieve financial firms of their toxic assets, Dodd-Frank removes an 
incentive for firms to accumulate risky assets that may turn toxic. In this view, Dodd-
Frank binds the Fed to the mast when the financial seas are calm, thus signaling to large 
interconnected firms that the Fed will have no choice but to resist their siren song in the 
event that their investment strategy threatens to crash the global economy; thus, they will 
not undertake systemically risky investment strategies in the first place. Similarly, the 
Fed will have even more reason to be vigilant in monitoring financial developments and 
preventing crises from developing, lest it find itself faced with another crisis after having 
been stripped of its best policy response. 
We express no view on whether Congress made the right decision by clarifying in 
Dodd-Frank that the Fed lacks both de jure and de facto authority to purchase troubled 
financial assets. For our purposes it suffices to note that the questions about the legality 
of the Fed bailouts of Bear Stearns and AIG do not rise to the level of a structural 
problem calling for a structural solution such as ending or auditing the Fed. 
Nor does Dodd-Frank’s clarification of any prior ambiguity in the Federal 
Reserve Act touch on the central issue of Fed independence. The Fed bailed out Bear 
Stearns and AIG because no other institution of government was able to do so in a timely 
fashion, and it had at least a colorable claim of authority. But bailouts need not be a core 
function of a central bank. True, just as there are reasons of political economy to vest 
monetary policy in an independent central bank, there are similar reasons to vest bailout 
authority in a financial actor that is independent of short-term political pressure. In this 
context too, political accountability can lead to dangerous departures from sound 
economic policy.76 And arguably, considerations of expertise suggest that the power to 
bail out systemically important firms ought to be given to the same independent central 
bank that already addresses other matters of macroeconomic policy through loans as well 
as purchases and sales of financial assets. 
However, it is also possible to delegate bailout authority to some other 
independent agency. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has long had 
resolution authority for a class of depositary institutions, and Title II of Dodd Frank 
expanded its role with respect to systemically important financial institutions.77 Whether 
or not the Fed, rather than some other independent agency, has bailout authority simply 																																																								
76 See Duff, supra note 12, at 204 (“The same basic rationale for delegating authority over monetary 
policy to an independent agency applies to financial stability policy.”); Levitin, supra note 71, at 505 
(“Political accountability [can] make bailout policy driven by electoral concerns”). 
77 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–94 (2010); 12 
C.F.R. § 380 (LEXIS 2015); Kwon-Yong Jin, Note, How to Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure 
of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of Entry 
Resolution, 124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1750–51 (2015) (discussing a regulatory gap closed by Dodd-Frank); 
Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012), transcript available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2012/spmay1012.html (arguing for broad resolution 
authority in the FDIC); Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to the Peterson 
Institute for International Economics: A Progress Report on the Resolution of Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (May 12, 2015), transcript available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmay1215.html  (explaining the FDIC’s role under Dodd-
Frank as a supplement to ordinary bankruptcy procedures). 
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does not bear on Fed independence with respect to monetary policy. As noted in Part I, 
separating these functions would necessitate some coordination among agencies that 
could, at least during a crisis, functionally turn those separate agencies into a single 
decision-making unit, but that is not necessarily a problem. It would not be our first 
choice to separate these functions, but separating them would say nothing about the 
wisdom of maintaining the Fed’s ability to act as lender of last resort (because the FDIC 
would, if the crisis were large enough, run out of money), and to conduct independent 
monetary policy. 
Does this mean that the complaints by critics that the Fed broke the law during the 
financial crisis can be ignored as irrelevant to our project? Probably, but not necessarily. 
We acknowledge that a longstanding pattern of law breaking by a government agency 
would be cause for dramatically reforming, or even abolishing, that agency. However, in 
our view, the claim that the Fed exceeded its authority in the Bear Stearns and AIG 
bailouts, even when fully credited, does not come close to demonstrating a pattern of law 
breaking. The bailouts, the complaint that they were illegal, and the congressional 
response in Dodd-Frank were an important episode in and after the financial crisis, but 
they do not bear on the fundamental question of central bank independence.78 
B. Transparency 
 
Critics also charge that the Fed is insufficiently transparent.79 The validity of this 
criticism varies with respect to task. The Fed achieves its various objectives through two 
kinds of actions. In stabilizing the macroeconomy, the Fed buys and sells financial assets, 
especially Treasury securities. Although situated differently from private actors, in taking 
such actions, the Fed functions as a kind of market actor. Meanwhile, the Fed also has 
regulatory authority over various market actors. In carrying out its role as regulator, the 
Fed operates much like any other agency, promulgating rules and bringing enforcement 
actions.80 																																																								
78 We have focused in this sub-Part on the critics’ strongest case, based on the claim that the Bear and 
AIG bailouts were outside of the authority of the Fed under Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. 
Relatedly, some critics argue that in engineering the Bear bailout the Fed abused its authority to grant 
exemptions from limits on Fed lending under Section 23A of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371C (2006). Without 
that exemption, the extension of credit to JPMorgan to acquire Bear would have been clearly unlawful. See, 
e.g., Orticelli, supra note 18 at 670 (noting that absent the exemption “the statute would expressly prohibit 
JPMorgan . . . from taking over Bear”). More broadly, on multiple occasions following the collapse of the 
sub-prime mortgage market, the Fed granted exemptions from Section 23A’s limits. “Under the 
circumstances, the Board’s chosen course of action may have been well justified, if not inevitable, [but] the 
crisis-driven exemptions from section 23A, which purposely exposed banks to risks associated with their 
affiliates’ nonbanking business and transferred federal subsidy outside the depository system, were not, and 
could not have been, consistent with the fundamental purposes of that statute.” Omarova, supra note 18 at 
1762–63. We do not disagree with this assessment, but neither do we think that, even in combination with 
the claims regarding violations of Section 13, it leads to the conclusion that the Fed is a lawless agency. 
79 See supra note 19; LABONTE, Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues, supra note 11 at 9–10; 
Emerson, supra note 11 (pointing to laws that render Fed decision making relatively opaque to outsiders). 
80  12 U.S.C. § 248 (LEXIS 2015) (“The Federal Reserve Board is authorized and empowered 
to promulgate such regulations as it may deem necessary to enforce compliance with the provisions of this 
subsection and the proper exercise of the powers granted therein.”); Enforcement Actions, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/enforcementactions/ (listing 
the entities against which the Fed has authority to take enforcement actions). 
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In carrying out its regulatory mandates, the Fed ought to be—and is—no less 
transparent than most other agencies. In general, modern administrative law strikes a 
balance between deference to agency expertise and accountability by imposing 
procedural constraints on agency rulemaking, enforcement actions, and adjudication. 
More than anything, these constraints aim to expose the reasons for agency decision 
making—that is, to render agency action transparent. The Fed falls within the sweeping 
definition of covered agencies in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 81 and thus, as 
a regulator, it is legally as transparent as any other agency82—and more transparent, at 
least as a formal matter, than those agencies that are specifically exempt from the APA. 
With respect to rulemaking, for example, like any other agency covered by the APA, if 
the Fed wishes its regulations to receive deference in court, it must follow the notice-and-
comment procedure affording the public rights to participate.83 
Perhaps it could be argued that because the Fed, as an independent agency, is not 
politically accountable, it ought to be subject to stricter transparency requirements than 
executive branch agencies. This argument would, in our view, be mistaken. As we shall 
explain momentarily,84 at some point, increased transparency amounts to external control. 
Yet if it makes sense, all things considered, to grant some regulatory task to an 
independent agency rather than to an executive branch agency, then it also makes sense 																																																								
81 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2011). 
82 Consider a routine recent example of accountability via transparency and participation afforded by the 
APA. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit observed in the course of upholding a Fed 
regulation of debit cards against a challenge brought pursuant to the APA, “[a]fter evaluating thousands of 
comments” on its proposed rule, “the [Federal Reserve] Board issued a Final Rule that” differed 
substantially from its original proposal.” NACS v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 746 
F.3d 474, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
83 See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (noting that mere “interpretative 
rules” issued outside the notice-and-comment process lack “the force and effect of law and are not 
accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process”) (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 
U.S. 87, 99 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a matter of administrative law, courts grant rules 
promulgated by independent agencies the same degree of deference that they grant to rules that emanate 
from executive branch agencies. This aspect of administrative law has been questioned. See Andrew T. 
Bond, Note, Parting the Sea: An Argument for Chevron’s Greater Applicability to Cabinet Than 
Independent Agencies, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (2014) (criticizing but acknowledging this feature of 
administrative law). Indeed, according to some versions of the so-called unitary executive theory, by 
vesting “The executive Power” in the president, Article II entirely forecloses execution of the law by 
independent agencies. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: 
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992). However,  many of the regulatory 
activities of the Fed and other independent agencies do not amount to execution of the law, see Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935) (distinguishing “quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative” 
agency action from executive action). Moreover, even with respect to law execution, there may be special 
reasons to exempt financial regulation from a putative more general constitutional requirement that law 
execution be accountable through the president. See Dina Mishra, An Executive-Power Non-Delegation 
Doctrine for the Private Administration of Federal Law, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1509, 1602 (2015) (explaining 
that “financial regulation may be” a “context[] in which the need for political impartiality is particularly 
strong,” and thus where any requirement of accountability through the president would be appropriately 
relaxed). In any event, even if the Fed cannot be distinguished from other independent agencies, we treat 
arguments about the constitutionality of independent agencies as such as beyond the scope of this Article. 
We assume the longstanding status quo allowing Congress to create independent agencies to be 
constitutional, and focus, chiefly in Part IV, on whether there are sufficient policy justifications for 
retaining Fed independence. 
84 See infra, text accompanying notes 90—93. 
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to impose no greater transparency requirements on the independent agency; doing so 
would render the independent agency politically accountable de facto, which would be 
inconsistent with the initial judgment to make the agency independent. 
To be clear, we do not need to quarrel with the claim that some of the regulatory 
mission now assigned to the Fed might be better assigned to a politically accountable 
actor, such as the Treasury Department. We take no position on that issue. Our point is 
only that so long as Congress has good reason to assign a regulatory task to an 
independent agency like the Fed, Congress also has good reason not to subject the agency 
to stricter transparency obligations than are thought appropriate for executive agencies 
engaged in regulation. 
For our purposes, the more important question is whether the Fed is insufficiently 
transparent with respect to monetary policy. As then-Chair of the Fed Ben Bernanke 
acknowledged in a 2010 speech, the case for transparency of the Fed’s market-participant 
functions is weaker than for the actions the Fed undertakes as a regulator.85 But even in 
the course of championing central bank independence, Bernanke acknowledged that 
weaker does not mean nonexistent, and Fed monetary policy is in fact somewhat open to 
public scrutiny. Fed chairs regularly testify before Congress and give speeches, while the 
FOMC—which sets monetary policy—releases minutes of its meetings and issues 
reports.86 These measures, Bernanke argued, “provide[] substantial grist for the activities 
of legions of ‘Fed watchers’ who analyze all aspects of monetary policy in great detail.”87 
Bernanke was and is correct that the Fed is not a secret cabal. Still, it can be 
argued that after-the-fact transparency does little good for those politicians and private 
actors who disagree with Fed policy. When undertaking notice-and-comment rulemaking 
pursuant to the APA, the Fed, like other agencies, must give the public an opportunity to 
comment on its proposed action and then actually give consideration to the public’s input 
before proceeding.88 By contrast, although the Fed can fairly be said to tell interested 
observers what it is doing and why, there are no direct mechanisms for those observers to 
challenge the Fed’s actions. As David Zaring observes, the FOMC is, in practice, “an 
agency governed by internally developed tradition in lieu of externally imposed 
constraints.”89 
Yet a transparency obligation, even without any mechanism for direct regulation, 
can act as a form of behavior modification for the actor subject to the obligation. 
																																																								
85 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability, Speech at 
the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan 
(May 25, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100525a.htm) the independence afforded 
central banks for the making of monetary policy should not be presumed to extend without qualification to 
its nonmonetary functions”). 
86 See id. 
87 Id. 
88 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 54-57 
(1983) (rejecting National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s rescission of passive restraint 
requirement as arbitrary and capricious where agency failed to offer adequate basis and explanation for its 
action). 
89 David Zaring, Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
157, 158 (2015). 
	 25	
Transparency requirements for private firms90 as well as public actors91 often work on the 
principle that sunlight is the best disinfectant. 92  At the same time, requirements of 
complete transparency can backfire—as when open meeting laws have the unintended but 
foreseeable consequence of driving the real action outside of the meeting and thus outside 
of the spotlight.93 Most deliberative bodies need at least some opportunities to meet in 
private so that members can speak freely. Even absent any illicit motives, both private 
and public actors will hesitate to give voice to positions that they wish to explore 
tentatively for fear that the public or a subset thereof will overreact. Where the relevant 
actors are the policy makers of a central bank—and with global markets finely attuned to 
interest rates—the risk is acute. 
There are also questions of practicality. Each day the Fed (or more precisely, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting on behalf of the FOMC) purchases and sells 
financial assets in order to carry out monetary policy.94 These numerous transactions 
could not possibly achieve their aim in real time if they were subject to the sort of back 
and forth with the public associated with notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Accordingly, during a July 2015 appearance before the House Financial Services 
Committee, Fed Chair Janet Yellen resisted calls for greater direct oversight of the Fed, 
treating proposed transparency requirements as a form of congressional control.95 One 
need not agree with Yellen that current law requires exactly the right degree of Fed 																																																								
90 For a description, see Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins 
and Beyond, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 613, 618–29 (1999) (cataloguing and evaluating various regimes of 
transparency as a form of regulation). 
91 The federal Freedom of Information Act and open meeting requirements, 5 U.S.C. § 552, along with 
their state analogues, are examples. 
92  Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10, 
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1910/1913_12_20_What_Pu
blicity_Ca.pdf (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”). 
93  See, e.g., 3 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, 479 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) (quoting James Madison on the need for privacy during 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787); James Bowen, Behind Closed Doors: Re-Examining The 
Tennessee Open Meetings Act and its Inapplicability to the Tennessee General Assembly, 35 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 133, 134 (2002) (promoting “a zone of privacy in which . . . discussions can freely take place 
[because s]unshine laws present the real possibility of deleterious incidental effects.”); Tim Groseclose & 
Nolan McCarty, The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 100, 114 
(2001) (finding a chilling effect of sunshine laws); Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark 
Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 531 (2009) (“Transparency may promote 
polarization and partisanship in the political dialogue.”). 
94 THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, THE FEDERAL RESERVE TODAY 12 (16th ed. 2012), 
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/education/federal_reserve_today/frtod
ay.pdf (describing the process by which the Open Market Committee conducts monetary policy); Open 
Market Operations, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2015) (explaining the 
role of the New York Fed); What We Do, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/whatwedo.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2015) (same). 
95 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Janet Yellen Warns Congress Against Adding to Fed’s Oversight, N.Y. 
TIMES B1 (Jul. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/business/yellen-federal-reserve-house-
testimony-oversight.html (quoting Fed Chair Yellen stating that “[e]fforts to further increase transparency, 
no matter how well intentioned, must avoid unintended consequences that could undermine the Federal 
Reserve’s ability to make policy in the long-run best interest of American families and businesses”). 
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transparency to see two general truths: First, that for just about any entity, there is an 
optimal level of transparency that falls short of total transparency; and second, that given 
the tendency of transparency to bleed into external control, where policy factors justify 
making an agency independent of direct external political control, the optimal level of 
transparency for that agency will be somewhat less (other things being equal) than the 
optimal level of transparency for agencies deemed properly subject to such control.96 
Thus, the claim that the Fed is insufficiently transparent has two dimensions. To 
the extent that the critics wish to see the Fed subject to greater transparency requirements 
in its regulatory functions, they may or may not have a point, but even if they do, greater 
transparency in this domain would not undermine the Fed’s core functions when it acts as 
a central bank. This aspect of the claim touches nothing fundamental. However, to the 
extent that the critics would like to see greater transparency in the Fed’s conduct of 
monetary policy as a means of controlling monetary policy, the prescription would 
undermine Fed independence in an area where such independence has been thought 
essential to its role as a central bank. 
 C.   Substantive Priorities 
 
The Fed’s substantive mandate obligates it to set and carry out monetary policy in 
such a manner that will “maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates 
commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate 
long-term interest rates.”97 As we noted briefly in Part I, these objectives can conflict. 
Other things being equal, and when the economy lacks substantial excess capacity, lower 
interest rates boost employment but also increase the risk of inflation, and vice-versa. 
Accordingly, actors with different interests will sometimes criticize the Fed for unduly 
emphasizing one aspect of its mandate at the expense of another. To paint with a very 
broad brush, conservatives would like the Fed to focus chiefly on fighting inflation, while 
progressives would like to see the Fed promote economic growth and thus job growth.98 
 It is tempting to say that if the Fed is simultaneously being criticized from the 
right for being too soft on inflation while being criticized from the left for being too soft 																																																								
96 We call these propositions general rather than universal truths in recognition of the fact that concerns 
such as separation of powers will sometimes complicate the calculus. Consider military affairs. Article II 
enshrines civilian control of the military by making the president Commander in Chief. The armed forces 
thus are by no means an independent agency. However, the need for operational secrecy will often be 
inconsistent with transparency to the general public or even to all of Congress.  
97 12 U.S.C. § 225a. 
98  See, e.g., Michelle A. L. Goldberg, Note, The Fed’s Dual Mandate: One Too Many?, 33 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 343, 352 (2013) (detailing Democratic support for and Republican opposition to the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act, which made explicit the unemployment prong of the Fed’s dual 
mandate); Mark Felsenthal, Fed Officials Not Attached to Dual Mandate, REUTERS, Jan. 9, 
2011,http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/09/us-usa-fed-mandate-idUSTRE70839720110109 (quoting 
Mike Pence, No. 3 House Republican, saying that the Fed “could do more for the American economy by 
focusing singularly on maintaining the value of the dollar and protecting the purchasing power of 
Americans . . . .”); see also id. (“With the Democrats in control of the White House and the Senate, a move 
to strip the Fed’s employment mandate would be unlikely to gain sufficient backing to become law.”); 
Arjun Kapur, Janet Yellen and the Future of the Federal Reserve, HARV. POLITICAL REV., Dec. 31, 2013, 
http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/janet-yellen-future-federal-reserve/ (“One might expect 
Republicans to run a tight monetary policy and Democrats an easy one, given prevailing party positions.”). 
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on unemployment, then it must be doing its job just right by steering a middle course, 
consistent with its multi-factor mandate. But that is not necessarily correct. Although 
economists disagree about the relative contribution of the price shock in oil and monetary 
policy in causing stagflation in the 1970s,99 there is little doubt that a poorly run central 
bank (in combination with external public and private factors) can set and conduct 
monetary policy in a way that neither constrains inflation nor promotes job growth. The 
very possibility of stagflation shows that monetary policy is not necessarily a zero-sum 
game, with every action that exacerbates one problem necessarily contributing to a 
solution to the converse problem. 
The post-2008 crisis period provides another, more positive example of how 
inflation and unemployment are not strictly inversely correlated. Despite repeated dire 
warnings by conservatives that extremely low interest rates would lead to runaway 
inflation,100 the Fed’s policy—including effectively negative interest rates for some of the 
recent period101—has not led to high inflation, even though that policy has been in place 
for almost seven years. 
Meanwhile, some of the policy preferences expressed by some conservatives are, 
to put the point politely, not exactly reality-based. The charge that the Fed has “debased” 																																																								
99 See Alan S. Blinder & Jeremy B. Rudd, The Supply Shock Explanation of the Great Stagflation 
Revisited, CEPS WORKING PAPER 46 (2008), 
https://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/176blinder.pdf (concluding that supply shocks were 
responsible for the lion’s share of unemployment during stagflation — 60% and 45% in the 1970s and 
1980-82, respectively — with monetary policy playing only a minor role); but see Robert B. Barsky & Lutz 
Kilian, Do We Really Know that Oil Caused the Great Stagflation? A Monetary Alternative, 16 NBER 
MACROECONOMICS 137, 163 (2001), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11065.pdf (arguing that exogenous oil 
supply shocks alone would not have caused the Great Stagflation of the 1970s without the effect of 
monetary policy); see also Robert B. Barsky & Lutz Killian, Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s, 
18 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 115, 133 (2004)  
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/meltzer/jep_2004_barsky_lutz_oilmacro.pdf (“Oil price shocks are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to explain stagflation in real GDP and in the implicit GDP deflator.”); Lutz Kilian, 
Oil Price Shocks, Monetary Policy, and Stagflation, (Univ. of Mich. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7324, 
2009), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/rbakilianpub.pdf (suggesting that exogenous oil price 
shocks led to stagflation because the Fed raised interest rates in response to the resulting inflationary 
pressures). 
100 See, e.g., Merrill Goozner, Bernanke Defends Low Interest Rates as Necessary, THE FISCAL TIMES 
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/02/02/Bernanke-Defends-Low-Interest-Rates-
As-Necessary (citing Republican Congressman Paul Ryan and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
President Narayana Kocherlakota warning that low interest rates would lead to higher inflation); Victoria 
McGrane, GOP Senate Takeover Puts Fed on Hot Seat, WALL ST. J.,Nov. 5, 2014, available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/gop-senate-takeover-would-put-fed-under-microscope-1415104673 
(explaining that Alabama Senator Richard Shelby voted against Janet Yellen due to her support for bond-
buying programs that he believed would lead to inflation); Open Letter to Ben Bernanke, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
15, 2010 12:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/11/15/open-letter-to-ben-bernanke/ (outlining 
the concern of several economists, investors, and political strategists, most of whom are close to 
Republicans, that quantitative easing would result in inflation). 
101 Richard G. Anderson & Yang Liu, How Low Can You Go? Negative Interest Rates and Investors’ 
Flight to Safety, THE REGIONAL ECONOMIST (Jan. 2013), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-
economist/january-2013/how-low-can-you-go-negative-interest-rates-and-investors-flight-to-safety 
(calculating real interest rates as negative); William T. Gavin & Diana A. Cooke, The Ups and Downs of 
Inflation and the Role of Fed Credibility, THE REGIONAL ECONOMIST (Apr. 2014), 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/april-2014/the-ups-and-downs-of-inflation-
and-the-role-of-fed-credibility (same). 
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the currency102 could most charitably be understood as a shorthand for the mistaken but 
not completely irrational fear that increases in the money supply would lead to inflation. 
The view is mistaken because the link between low interest rates and inflation depends on 
the economy functioning at or close to full capacity. However, the fear is not irrational, 
because timing is delicate. It is at least possible that a central banker could keep interest 
rates too low too long out of the erroneous belief that the economy has more excess 
capacity than it in fact has. 
Yet some Fed critics pretty clearly do not simply mean their objections as 
shorthand for a view about the timing of interest rate increases. Rather, in the period 
since the crisis, some commentators have issued the debasement charge based on the 
apparent belief that increasing the money supply is inherently problematic. For example, 
the complaint that that the Fed’s policy of quantitative easing created money “out of thin 
air”103 assumes as a baseline some definition of money that is not created out of thin air. 
Yet that assumption is unwarranted. Any medium of exchange—including precious 
metal—has value only because people believe that other people will continue to believe 
that it has value. There are sound reasons why, in particular circumstances, the money 
supply ought not to be increased, but the mere fact that a central bank in a sovereign 
nation with its own currency can increase the money supply without having to discover 
and dig up nuggets of a material that is arbitrarily denominated as valuable is not itself a 
ground for concern.104 
Likewise, calls by some on the right to amend the Fed’s mandate so that it only 
focuses on inflation105 cannot be taken at face value. A central bank that viewed its 
mission as solely and constantly battling inflation would risk sending the economy into a 
deflationary spiral that could easily turn into a depression. No one could sensibly 
advocate that the Fed target a zero rate of inflation, because even a small error on the 																																																								
102  See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Money Makes Crazy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/opinion/paul-krugman-money-makes-crazy.html?_r=1 (“Mr. Paul 
likes to warn that the Fed’s efforts to bolster the economy may lead to hyperinflation; he loves talking 
about the wheelbarrows of cash that people carted around in Weimar Germany.”). 
103 See supra note 13. 
104 Moreover, even those countries that might wish to tie their currency to such nuggets of a precious 
metal must still set policies that determine how much currency is supported by a given weight of the metal. 
Setting that amount is monetary policy. The only question is who should set that policy. Our argument here 
is not that we are choosing between a system with a human element and one that is purely mechanical. 
Instead, we are choosing between systems on the basis of which humans, in which institutional 
arrangements, will make those policy decisions. See infra, text accompanying notes 110—112. 
105  See MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41656, CHANGING THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S 
MANDATE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41656.pdf (describing 
bills that “would strike the goal of maximum employment from the mandate, leaving a single goal of price 
stability, and require the Fed to adopt an inflation target.”); Goldberg, supra note 98, at 368 (citing Daniel 
Thornton of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for the proposition that most economists do not support 
the dual mandate, because they believe either that unemployment is affected by economic fundamentals 
distinct from monetary police or price stability will in and of itself keep unemployment in check); Victoria 
McGrane & Kristina Peterson, For Yellen, Fed’s Dual Mandate Guides Thinking, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 
2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304868404579194300406860572 (“some 
Republicans think the employment component has taken the Fed’s focus off the more important and 
achievable mission of low inflation.”); John B. Taylor, End the Fed’s Dual Mandate and Focus on Prices, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-09-16/end-the-fed-s-
dual-mandate-and-focus-on-prices-john-b-taylor. 
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wrong side could yield deflation. Accordingly, the rational version of the conservative 
critique of the Fed’s multi-prong mandate must be that the critics wish to see the balance 
struck differently. So long as there is no serious risk of deflation, the critics mean (or at 
least ought) to say, the Fed ought not permit additional inflation as the price of promoting 
job growth. 
That claim finds its mirror in a criticism by progressives that, notwithstanding its 
multi-prong mandate, too often the Fed has prioritized fighting inflation over promoting 
economic and job growth.106 This critique sometimes has an institutional component. The 
Fed is a hybrid public/private entity that gives substantially greater weight to the interests 
and outlook of bankers and investors than to the interests of Americans who live from 
paycheck to paycheck. Accordingly, the argument goes, the Fed is rigged to favor its 
inflation-fighting mandate at the expense of job growth.107 
This charge strikes us as simplistic and unrealistic. It is certainly true that workers 
(for example) are not directly represented in the Fed’s monetary-policy-making 
processes. But it does not follow that their interests are unrepresented, partly because 
economic progressives are not the only people who (other things being equal) prefer low 
interest rates. Investors in stocks and holders of existing bonds like low interest rates as 
well.108 Thus, insofar as the Fed’s structure gives weight to the preferences of investors, 
that does not systematically disfavor pro-growth policies. And indeed, the Fed’s record 
since the crisis (and somewhat less consistently, before the crisis as well) shows that 
whatever else one might say about the Fed, it has hardly been captured by inflation 
hawks. 
To be clear, we do not claim that the Fed is a “Goldilocks” agency, always setting 
monetary policy neither too much in one or the other direction but always “just right.” 
We are keenly aware that when inflation and growth correlate inversely, as they often do, 
it is possible for the Fed to err in one way or the other. Whether one thinks that the Fed 
has, or over time likely will, err in either direction will depend on one’s interests and 																																																								
106 See LABONTE, CHANGING THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S MANDATE, supra note 105 at 4 (“It is debatable 
whether an inflation target is compatible with the equal weighting of maximum employment and price 
stability in the dual mandate—arguably, it communicates to the public a greater focus on inflation, 
intentionally or not.”); Cameron DeHart, The Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate: Balancing Act or Inflation 
Fixation? 5 (The Ohio State Univ., Honors Research Thesis, 2013),  
https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/63984/DeHart_Honors_Thesis.pdf?sequence=1 (“The Fed 
uses its independence to re-interpret the ‘dual mandate’ such that price stability is a precondition for 
maximum employment.”); id. at 11 (“Analytical evidence suggests that the Fed was decidedly more 
focused on inflation during the observed time period.”); George A. Kahn & Lisa Taylor, Evolving Market 
Perceptions of Federal Reserve Policy Objectives, ECONOMIC REVIEW 5, 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/14q1Kahn-Taylor.pdf (“During the Volcker era when 
inflation was deemed excessive, policymakers placed a high priority on lowering inflation even at the 
expense of high and rising unemployment. During the Greenspan era, as further disinflation was achieved, 
policymakers emphasized ‘sustainable economic growth,’ with a view that such an outcome could be 
achieved only in an environment of low and stable inflation.”); Thornton, supra note 15; id. at 128 (noting 
that Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker made a case for “inflation first” monetary policy in February 1980 
congressional testimony); see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 15.  
107 See supra note 14. 
108 ANDREW B. ABEL, BEN S. BERNANKE, & DEAN CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS 141 (6th ed. 2008) 
(“A higher interest rate increases the user cost of capital and thus reduces desired investment.”); N. 
GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 421 (6th ed. 2007) (noting that higher interest rates lead to 
decreases in investment). 
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outlook. Our concern here is how judgments about the Fed’s priorities might translate 
into concrete reforms. 
In principle, it should be possible to set different priorities for the Fed without 
challenging Fed independence. For example, the Fed’s statutory mandate could be 
rewritten to specify a numerical target of, say, two percent annual inflation, or three 
percent unemployment, or some particular formula that incorporated both—for example, 
minimize unemployment unless further steps to promote employment would cause 
inflation to rise above two percent. 
In practice, however, the diversity of economic circumstances that can arise will 
mean that a rigid numerical formula will likely lead to a policy path that even a proponent 
of the formula would regard as suboptimal. For example, even holding inflation constant, 
there will be disagreement about the so-called natural rate of unemployment, and a 
statutory mandate based on assumptions that prove false over time could lead a Fed that 
is bound by that mandate to adopt harmful monetary policies. In a macroeconomy that 
can fairly be described as subject to the influence of “animal spirits,”109 any rule-like 
approach to a central bank’s mandate will leave the central bank with insufficient 
flexibility to rein in those spirits. 
The solution—embodied in the Fed’s existing multi-factor mandate—is to 
delegate to the central bank the discretion to make an all-things-considered judgment 
about how to balance the sometimes-conflicting goals of monetary policy. This solution 
should be very familiar to anyone acquainted with the modern administrative state. Given 
the complexity and fluidity of the problem, a generalist legislature cannot formulate 
sensible precise rules in advance, and so sets the broad outlines of the policy, leaving to 
the agency the task of filling in the details. 
Accordingly, whether one thinks that the Fed tends to favor too-loose or too-strict 
monetary policy, one cannot sensibly propose ex ante formulaic controls on the Fed. This 
may explain why, regardless of where they fall on the political spectrum, many critics of 
the balance the Fed has struck among the factors in its multi-factor mandate seek to 
subject the Fed to ongoing political oversight. They cannot settle for a one-time change in 
the Fed’s mandate substituting a rigid rule for Fed discretion because such discretion is 
needed to give sensible effect to any set of priorities. Instead, these critics aim to rein in 
the Fed each time it uses its discretion in ways the critics dislike. The critics want 
political actors to be able to require the Fed to make course adjustments that the Fed, in 
its discretion, would not otherwise make. In short, although not on its face a challenge to 
Fed independence, the claim that the Fed pursues the wrong priorities amounts in practice 
to a challenge to such independence. 
There are also those who criticize the Fed for failing to adopt a rule-based 
monetary policy regime. In monetary theory, this is known as the “rules vs. discretion” 
debate.110 One type of rule would tie the value of money to the supply of a commodity or 
set of commodities, the most famous version of which is the Gold Standard. But other 
rules are possible as well. For example, some economists have long called on the Fed to 
increase the money supply by a fixed percentage each year, with the rate determined by a 																																																								
109  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 161 
(1936). 
110 See, e.g., William Van Lear, A Review of the Rules versus Discretion Debate in Monetary Policy, 26 
(1) E. ECON. J. 29, 29-39 (2000). 
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simple equation.111 The idea is to prevent the Fed from exercising discretion in setting 
monetary policy, because the consequences of the Fed’s overreacting or underreacting are 
supposedly worse than not acting at all. 
There would thus appear to be two separate questions here. First, should monetary 
policy be operated under a fixed set of mechanical rules, or instead should the conduct of 
monetary policy be deliberately arranged to require ongoing human judgment in 
responding to emerging evidence? Second, if human judgment is going to be part of the 
setting of monetary policy, should that human judgment be exercised by politically 
insulated human beings, or by more directly politically accountable human beings?   
In one sense, then, our enterprise in this article would seem to require us simply to 
assume that the answer to the first question is “discretion, not rules,” and then to answer 
the second question by saying that such discretion should be exercised by an independent 
Fed. Yet that is not in fact our approach. We argue that the first question presents a false 
choice. Even if one thinks that monetary policy should be carried out according to rigid 
rules, there must be a human element in determining the content of those rules in the first 
place, including rules about whether and how the rules can be changed. Those rules can 
be set legislatively (that is, by politicians directly), by executive agencies (whose 
personnel are appointed and removable by politicians), or by an independent agency 
(whose staff are sheltered from direct political control). Our argument, that politically 
independent economic specialists should set monetary policy, thus subsumes the rules-
versus-discretion question, because we recognize that that debate—although important on 
its own terms, as a matter of determining the Fed’s actions on an ongoing basis—falsely 
imagines that human judgment can be removed from the establishment and maintenance 
over time of a monetary system. 
For example, if Congress decided (quite unwisely, in our view) to put the U.S. 
back on a gold standard, it might also decide that the only way to change the dollars-to-
gold ratio in the future would be by enacting new legislation; in other words, the gold-
standard legislation itself would set the ratio. Or, Congress could decide (much more 
wisely, at least given its initial bad decision to adopt a gold standard) to set rules that 
anticipate when and by whom the ratio could be altered or even that the gold standard 
could be abandoned entirely, for example, during a crisis like 2008. Our argument here is 
that, no matter what the background regime might be, there is virtually no rules-based 
regime that removes the human ability (and responsibility) to set the rules and to alter the 
																																																								
111  The “quantity equation,” usually written MV = PQ, when converted to annual rates of growth, 
connects the desired growth rate of the money supply (M) to the growth in the rate at which money is used 
in transactions (the “velocity” of money, V), the rate of growth of the price level (P), and the rate of growth 
of real GDP (Q). See Equation of Exchange (MV=PQ) / Quantity Theory of Money, ECONMENTOR, 
http://www.econmentor.com/college-macro/associated-macroeconomic-topics/money/equation-of-
exchange-mv=pq--quantity-theory-of-money/text/362.html#Equation of Exchange (MV=PQ) / Quantity 
Theory of Money (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). The last three variables are assumed to grow at constant rates, 
making it possible simply to mandate that the Fed increase M at the rate necessary to achieve stable prices 
and economic growth. See id. This theory has long been hotly contested, and the empirical evidence shows 
that the relevant variables change over time at varying and unpredictable rates. See IRVING FISHER, THE 
PURCHASING POWER OF MONEY, ITS DETERMINATION AND RELATION TO CREDIT, INTEREST AND CRISES 
595 (1911). 
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rules.112 The best institutional design, in our view, would have politically independent 
human beings making judgments about when and how to change the rules. 
 
* * * 
 We have seen in this Part that some of the criticisms that have recently been 
leveled at the Fed do not challenge the Fed’s independence in the area where 
conventional wisdom holds that it needs to be independent of day-to-day political 
influence: in the making and implementation of monetary policy. Yet some such 
criticisms do pose a challenge in just that area. We think that many of these criticisms are 
mistaken as a substantive policy matter, but others will draw different conclusions. If one 
is persuaded that Fed independence stands as an obstacle to substantively optimal policy, 
one will need a very strong reason for valuing Fed independence more highly than the 
substantive policy. Thus, we turn next to asking whether there is a strong justification for 
Fed independence. 
III. How the Fed Saved the Economy, and Why It Might Have to Do So Again 	
The Federal Reserve’s role as an independent central bank necessarily puts it in a 
unique position in the U.S. economic and political system. When a crisis emerges, the 
Fed’s combination of expertise and political insulation gives it the ability to respond 
quickly and with appropriately calibrated strength to prevent matters from getting truly 
out of hand, and to guide the financial markets and the economy back toward stability. 
The Fed’s recent performance in preventing a complete global economic meltdown is one 
of the under-appreciated stories of our time. 
Moreover, the Fed’s necessary emergency actions might be needed again in the 
not-too-distant future, in a situation that would make it clear that the Fed’s vaunted 
independence is essential to solving and preventing self-inflicted damage. Perversely, 
however, if the Fed’s actions actually do frustrate the desires of the politicians who might 
precipitate such a crisis, the Fed could be required to sign its own political death warrant 
in order to rescue the economy. Fortunately, there is a way to save the Fed from having to 
make such a fateful choice, as we discuss below. 
																																																								
112 The only possible exception that occurs to us would be an unamendable constitutional provision 
setting forth a mechanical rule. Although the initial adoption of such a rule would require the exercise of 
human judgment, its subsequent operation would be, in principle at least, automatic. We dismiss this 
possibility because even those constitutions that purport to permanently entrench certain features, such as 
Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law, do not entrench institutional arrangements regarding monetary 
policy. Even purportedly unamendable constitutional provisions, moreover, can be changed by replacing 
the constitution. 
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A. The Fed, the Existential Crisis of 2008-09, and the Aftermath 
 
Like most institutions of government, the Federal Reserve is designed to operate 
normally during normal times.113  Its day-to-day activities certainly include vigilantly 
scanning the horizon for storms, but most of its resources are quite sensibly devoted to 
making sure that the financial system runs smoothly even when no crises are imminent. 
Because some serious problems can arise not only from unexpected outside forces (such 
as a spike in a vital commodity such as oil due to a war in the Middle East, or a stock 
market crisis in a major foreign trading partner like China) but also from imbalances 
within the U.S. financial system, the Fed must actively ensure that the financial system is 
not developing problems that could suddenly metastasize into full-blown crises. Its 
regulatory role, therefore, is in part designed to guarantee that normal day-to-day 
operations are held within safe boundaries. 
As we noted in our Introduction,114 one might reasonably fault the Fed for failing 
to carry out its oversight duties of the financial system during the years leading up to the 
2008 global financial crisis. Especially in a low-interest rate environment—which was a 
sensible policy posture during that time period, given the continued weakness of the 
economy throughout George W. Bush’s presidency—the Fed, at least with the benefit of 
20/20 hindsight, should have been much more vigilant about the emergence of problems 
that were perhaps inevitable in an economy where housing prices were rising very 
rapidly. 
As we described in Part I, the fundamental danger in any financial system is that 
the banks could experience flash crises known as “runs,” which can destroy not just 
individual banks but, through financial contagion effects, also spread to otherwise healthy 
financial institutions.115 Although the Fed, in its early years, failed its first big test of 
being the “lender of last resort” at the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 (and 
continuing for years thereafter), the Fed learned its lesson and subsequently became the 
lynchpin of a system that has protected the U.S. financial system from further such 
crises. 116  The period between the end of the Great Depression and 2008 was not, 																																																								
113  Some agencies are set up specifically to deal with unpredictable crises, such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. 6 U.S.C. § 313 (2007). Even those agencies, of course, have ongoing 
operations and management imperatives that they carry out between crises. 
114 See supra, text accompanying note 18. 
115 For a particularly vivid depiction of a bank run, see IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films (II) 
1946).  There, the depositors in a financial institution learn that there is not enough cash on hand for the 
institution to pay daily withdrawals. At that point, all of the depositors demand to be refunded their money 
immediately, which of course is not possible. A short-term cash flow problem thus threatens to shutter a 
fundamentally healthy financial institution. What is not depicted in that film is the effect that this run would 
have on other institutions, when word spread that depositors at this particular institution had not been paid 
their money. This fictionalized account repeatedly played out in real life, to disastrous effect, through the 
early years of the Great Depression. 
116 Congress played a role as well, instituting important protections such as deposit insurance, along with 
other securities regulation and similar innovations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2015). One of Congress’s most 
important protections against systemic collapse—the formal separation of commercial banks and 
investment banks—was repealed by Congress several decades later. Arguably, this later change and other 
deregulatory actions by Congress and relevant agencies set the stage for the 2008 crisis. The Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), repealed by The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).  Therefore, although we partly fault the Fed for failing to prevent the 
buildup of the financial imbalances that led to that crisis, we are certainly mindful that the Fed was perhaps 
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obviously, one of uninterrupted prosperity,117 but it was a period notable for a significant 
decrease in the frequency and severity of financial and economic crises, compared to the 
decades before the Great Depression. 
With hindsight, we now know that the 2000s boom in housing was enabled by the 
emergence of a so-called “shadow banking” sector. That is, although the Fed and other 
relevant regulators were able to prevent the banks from experiencing the types of runs 
that nearly destroyed the economy in the 1930’s, investment banks like Lehman Brothers 
and a growing number of hedge funds were engaging in bank-like activities that created a 
global market in payment streams from aggregated mortgage debt, which in turn led to 
irresponsible lending. Whereas in the earlier period, a conventional local mortgage lender 
would typically issue a thirty-year mortgage and then patiently collect monthly payments 
for the life of the loan, by the dawn of the new millennium, financial “engineers” had 
figured out how to provide all kinds of variations on traditional mortgages, and to offer 
them through financial institutions that operated nationwide, with the payment streams 
sold to investors worldwide. 
Even traditional mortgages were turned into new categories of investment 
securities that were then traded on globalized markets, with the buyers of those securities 
dependent on the representations of credit rating agencies that the underlying mortgages 
were safe and that the risk of default was computed accurately. As a further hedge against 
risk, financial institutions began to purchase insurance policies known as credit default 
swaps, which essentially were guarantees by other financial institutions that the holders 
of such swaps would be made whole if any securities unexpectedly failed to pay off. 
This shadow-banking sector was, of course, just as interconnected as traditional 
banks have always been. In fact, the connections were more complex, and the aggregate 
dollar amounts were in the trillions. These large portfolios were nonetheless deemed safe, 
because analysts assessed the risk of default for any particular security as a statistically 
independent probability, isolated from the possibility of financial contagion. Or, to put it 
more simply, the financial engineers believed that all of the securities that they were 
creating were safe, because if one security failed, all of the other securities would still be 
there. But it was only a matter of time before some securities would fail, and if the failure 
was significant enough, the interconnections between the various financial securities 
could start to unravel the system.118 
																																																																																																																																																																					
only at fault for failing to respond adequately to a disaster that was set in motion by the unwise decisions of 
political actors. 
117 This long period of rising national income has, unfortunately, also been a period of rising inequality. 
Although distributive justice is generally not within the Fed’s policy goals, critics on the political left have 
long faulted the Fed for engaging in policies that enrich financial market players while paying insufficient 
attention to monetary policy’s effects on the middle class and poor. See supra, text accompanying notes 
106—107. 
118 Details of the now-familiar story recounted in the foregoing paragraph and the two that precede it can 
be found in many places. See, e.g., Zoltan Pozsar, The Rise and Fall of the Shadow Banking System, 
MOODY’S ANALYTICS (July 2008), https://www.economy.com/sbs; Alan Moirera & Alexi Savov, The 
Macroeconomics of Shadow Banking (Yale Univ., Faculty Paper 2015), 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/alanmoreira/Papers/ShadowMacro.pdf; Daniel Sanches, Shadow Banking and 
the Crisis of 2007-08, PHILA. FED (Apr.- June 2004), 
https://philadelphiafed.org/research.../brq214_shadow_banking.pdf.  For a popular account, see generally 
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010). 
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Again, one can reasonably argue that the Fed should have seen these problems 
while they were emerging. Even though there is no obvious way to know when we have 
crossed over from a simple bull market to a bubble, the Fed might well have been in a 
position to tighten its regulations regarding these formerly unseen financial institutions. 
Of course, as we emphasize throughout this article, the Fed does not act in a political 
vacuum, and there was a great deal of political pressure preventing the Fed and other 
agencies from tamping down these temporarily profitable opportunities. There was 
money to be made, and the political branches sided with those whose fortunes were 
dependent on a continued hands-off attitude by the Fed and other regulators. 
At worst, then, the Fed can be blamed for being unwilling to risk its policy 
independence by taking actions that could have raised the ire of Congress and the Bush 
administration. Perhaps the Fed, like nearly everyone else at the time, also 
underestimated the risks.119 What is clear, however, is that the Fed not only stepped 
forward when the crisis erupted and quite literally saved the economy from collapse, but 
it was the only institution that could have done so, both practically and politically. 
Once the financial crisis was set in motion by the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
and other shocking events, the ensuing financial panic wiped out trillions of dollars of 
notional value in the markets. One of the largest insurers of financial products, AIG, 
discovered that its business model was based on the flawed idea that not everything could 
go bad at the same time. But it could, and it did. 
In late 2008, there was serious question whether matters had already gotten so far 
out of hand that a second Great Depression was inevitable. As we noted in our 
Introduction, the political branches stepped forward with a combination of bailouts that 
prominently included the creation of the Troubled-Assets Relief Program (TARP). 
TARP, however, was worth only about $700 billion, which was dwarfed by the trillions 
of dollars in paper wealth that were hanging in the balance. And because TARP alone 
created a political rebellion on the left of the Democratic Party and the right of the 
Republican Party, the political response was doomed to be inadequate.120 
In that environment, the Fed was clearly the only institution that could be counted 
on to act in the interests of saving the system, rather than worrying about misplaced 
accusations of “bailing out losers.”121 Moreover, the trillions of dollars necessary to stop 
the contagion from spreading farther simply did not exist. Only the Fed, with its unique 
ability to create new money when necessary, could do what was needed. As we discussed 
in Part II, 122  there are prima facie plausible criticisms of the Fed for exceeding its 																																																								
119 Nearly everyone, but not everyone. See LEWIS, supra note 118.  
120 The unpopularity of TARP on the populist right was certainly a key element in the emergence of what 
is now known as the Tea Party movement. Bob Bennett, a staunchly conservative Republican U.S. Senator 
from Utah, voted to pass TARP. He then lost his party’s nominating caucus in 2010, ending his political 
career. Tea Party activists at the convention reportedly chanted derisively, “TARP!  TARP!  TARP!” to 
cheer Bennett’s defeat. See Dunstan Prial, Occupy Wall Street, Tea Party Movements Both Born of Bank 
Bailouts, FOX BUS. (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2011/10/19/occupy-wall-street-
tea-party-born-bank-bailouts/. 
121 If any institution is aware of the dangers of moral hazard, it is certainly the Fed, given that the Fed’s 
regulatory role is so clearly aimed at discouraging financial arrangements that lead to increasingly risky 
behavior. Even so, the Fed’s role also makes it aware that other factors must be balanced against such 
concerns. 
122 See supra, text accompanying notes 66-78. 
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statutory authority in pursuit of these policies, but such technical criticisms ultimately 
ignore the very nature of the Fed’s role as lender of last resort. 
Moreover, the Fed also knew that it possessed the ability to destroy money, which 
it could do if it found that the money that it had created threatened to create inflation. As 
it turned out, however, the new money had its desired effect, with none of the bad 
possible side effects. Banks and other financial institutions were given sufficient funds to 
make it unnecessary to continue to sell off their financial holdings, stopping the 
contagion as other asset holders were not forced to sell their assets at fire sale prices. To 
the extent that the Fed’s injection of liquidity was inadequate, it was largely because 
financial institutions sat on the money the Fed created, acting with newfound extreme 
caution to protect their own balance sheets from even the hint of risk. Rather than using 
the new money to restore prosperity, therefore, the bailed-out financial institutions simply 
held onto safe assets. The Fed had stopped the crisis, but the hope that the private sector 
would quickly resume normal activity went unfulfilled.123 
In addition to pouring new money into the financial markets to contain the 
disaster that inadequate regulation had enabled, the Fed also deployed its key monetary 
policy tool to fight the Great Recession. Acting quickly, the Fed lowered its target 
interest rate in steps, setting a zero percent target beginning on December 16, 2008.124 
The economy remained weak, and continuing to reduce interest rates is the standard 
response to a weakened economy. However, interest rates cannot be reduced below zero, 
because (other than situations in which people will actually pay a financial institution to 
hold their money, in what amounts to purchasing a virtual vault) there is no reason to 
deposit money rather than hold onto it, if the payoff is zero either way. Certainly, no one 
would give an institution money in exchange for the promise that the institution will 
return less money in the future. This is commonly known as the Zero Lower Bound.125 
Cutting its target interest rate to zero, therefore, was the most that the Fed could 
do, using its standard approach to setting monetary policy. The hope was that the 
economy would quickly recover, and that the Fed could then move interest rates into a 
range within which it would again be possible to move rates up and down in anticipation 
of future fluctuations in the economy. Instead, because the economy has remained so 
disappointingly weak for so long,126 as of early 2016, the Fed has only raised interest 																																																								
123 See Ben Protess & Eric Dash, Many Banks Are Clinging to Billions of Bailout Money, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 18, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/many-banks-are-clinging-to-billions-
in-bailout-money/?_r=0. 
124 See Joseph Lawler, Fed’s zero interest-rate policy stretches into seventh year, WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 
28, 2015 2:32 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/feds-zero-interest-rate-policy-stretches-into-
seventh-year/article/2575117.  
125  See R.A, The zero lower bound in our minds, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/01/monetary-policy; see also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., 
How Negative Can Rates Go?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/how-negative-can-rates-go/ (arguing that the lower bound is 
not precisely 0.0 percent for all borrowing, but the idea is the same). 
126 Although the unemployment rate has recently fallen to levels that in the past would have suggested 
that the economy had reached full employment, the other indicators that normally accompany a 
strengthening economy—in particular, robust wage increases and an increase in the growth rate of gross 
domestic product—have persistently failed to materialize. In the period since the official end of the Great 
Recession, the economy has stalled each time that it has shown some promise of accelerating. See Josh 
Bivens, Andrew Fieldhouse & Heidi Shierholz, From free-fall to stagnation, ECON. POLICY INST. (Feb. 14, 
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rates once since the onset of the Great Recession (from zero to 0.25 percent,127  in 
December 2015), although it has announced plans for continued increases in the not-too-
distant future.128 
As we argue in Part IV, the main reason that the Fed has not been able to resume 
its historical role of prudently adjusting interest rates to smooth economic fluctuations is 
that the president and Congress have agreed to enact perversely contractionary policies 
that have slowed the economy’s recovery. Moreover, these misguided fiscal policies have 
all but forced the Fed to do what it can to prevent the economy from sliding back into 
recession (and another potential financial crisis). The various waves of Quantitative 
Easing have seen the Fed redirect its asset purchases in a way that would provide some 
forward movement to the economy. Even those economists who support the Fed in these 
efforts concede that the positive impacts have been modest, but something is still better 
than nothing.129 
Disputes about the Fed’s various policy choices aside, however, the important 
point here is that the Fed was the only institution in 2008 and 2009 that had the ability to 
create money—to be what central banks need to be, which is the lender of last resort. As 
it happened, a lot of money needed to be created, given the severity of the immediate 
crisis. And the Fed, even knowing that it is constantly in danger of running afoul of the 
predispositions of powerful politicians, stepped up and prevented the financial crisis from 
become a global depression. 
We hope that the Fed will never need to take this kind of action again. At the very 
least, we ought to be able to count on our politicians not to create the threat of a crisis that 
only the Fed can prevent. As we shall see in sub-Parts B and C, however, there is a very 
real possibility that the Fed will be required to prevent a completely avoidable (and 
entirely politically inspired) train wreck. 
B. The Debt Ceiling and the President’s Options During a Standoff 
 
A longstanding statute known as the “debt ceiling” purports to prevent the level of 
federal debt from rising above a specific dollar figure, specified in the statute.130 Prior to 
2011, this law was essentially a meaningless bit of feel-good legislation with no practical 																																																																																																																																																																					
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import. Although there had been occasions in previous decades in which the party in 
opposition to the then-sitting president would use the occasion of a required increase in 
the debt ceiling to offer patriotic speeches about the supposed irresponsibility of allowing 
the national debt to continue to increase, pretty much everyone knew that such 
grandstanding was meaningless political theater. 
The problem was not necessarily that these politicians were insincere in their 
statements that they did not want the debt to rise.131 Indeed, as we discuss in Part IV 
below, one of the major barriers to sensible policy in the current environment is the belief 
among so many politicians that budgetary austerity somehow will heal the economy’s 
ills. The larger problem, then, is not that there are politicians who refuse to control the 
national debt, but that there are so few politicians who know (or are willing to admit) a 
point so basic that it underlay Hamilton’s 1790 Report on the Public Credit, which in turn 
laid the foundation for America’s eventual emergence as the world’s largest economy—
that some level of government debt is a virtue, not a vice, so that it would be an 
affirmatively bad idea to pay the federal government’s debt down to anywhere near 
zero.132 
In that sense, then, the status quo ante was an essentially harmless matter of 
political theater. Everyone knew that the already-passed spending and taxing laws 
required additional borrowing, and the occasional necessity to increase the dollar limit in 
the debt ceiling statute afforded everyone the opportunity to blame everyone else for our 
supposedly irresponsible fiscal policies. After a few days of speechmaking, the reality 
would return that the spending and taxing laws actually had to be executed as written, 
which necessarily meant updating the debt ceiling statute. 
After the 2010 midterm elections, however, the new Republican majority in the 
House of Representatives seized upon a novel political strategy. Rather than simply 
conceding that the debt ceiling’s level would need to be adjusted in light of congressional 
enactments, the new view was that the president could be accused of “wanting to increase 
the debt ceiling.” And because a person who wants something must necessarily pay for it, 
the “price” of a debt ceiling increase would be for the president to agree to change one or 
more laws in ways that the House majority found appealing, but which they had not been 
able to achieve through normal legislative means. Although there was nothing logically 
limiting the Republicans’ demands to the realm of fiscal policy—they could, after all, 
have refused to increase the debt ceiling unless the president agreed to repeal 
environmental laws, or to support abortion restrictions, or anything else that the president 
would not otherwise support—in the summer of 2011, the Republican leadership in the 
House announced that their party would not increase the debt ceiling without further cuts 																																																								
131 On the other hand, it is difficult not to suspect that insincerity and cynicism were, and are, in ample 
supply in fiscal policy debates. Many, if not most, of the politicians who complain the loudest about the 
national debt refuse to vote to increase taxes at all, and the spending cuts that they are willing to 
countenance are too small to make a serious difference. Being against borrowing, apparently, means 
wishing that it were possible to get something for nothing. Although we are actually pleased that these 
politicians have not succeeded in their goal of cutting spending sufficiently to reduce the national debt, it is 
impossible not to notice the logical inconsistency of those who claim to disagree with us. 
132  See, Alexander Hamilton, First Report on the Further Provision Necessary for 
Establishing Public Credit, in 7 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 225 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. 
Cooke eds., 1963); see also Neil H. Buchanan, Why We Should Never Pay Down the National Debt, 50 U. 
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in federal spending, even though the House had only weeks before passed a continuing 
resolution that included spending cuts, and even though the bill that they passed would, 
as a matter of simple arithmetic, still require the debt ceiling to be increased.133 
The White House responded to these demands by agreeing to negotiate with 
House leaders, narrowly averting a first-ever default on U.S. obligations in early August 
2011 only by agreeing to a series of actions that ended in large, new cuts in current and 
future spending. In particular, after the failure of a bipartisan “super committee” to agree 
on precisely targeted measures, the now-infamous “sequester” went into effect, resulting 
in automatic and indiscriminate cuts in domestic and military spending134 that continue to 
this day to limit the path of federal spending, even after legislation enacted in 2013 and 
2015 to ease the sequester caps somewhat.135 
Unsurprisingly, Republicans in Congress viewed their victory in the summer of 
2011 as a template for the future. Senator Mitch McConnell, then the minority leader in 
the Senate, announced that the debt ceiling would henceforth be a bargaining chip, and 
that President Obama should expect to have to give something up if he wanted Congress 
to give him the authority to borrow more money. Because the 2011 agreement had 
increased the debt ceiling only to a level that would be sufficient for a little more than 
two years, given the (decreasing, but still positive) annual budget deficit, the next debt 
ceiling political standoff was baked into that legislation.136 
Before that next drop-dead date was reached, the authors of the current article 
wrote a series of articles in which we argued that the president would be justified in 
announcing that the debt ceiling statute is unconstitutional, and that he would therefore 
refuse to allow the debt ceiling to prevent him from carrying out his duties under the 
spending and revenue laws.137 We coined the term “trilemma” to describe the president’s 
impossible position, should Congress refuse to increase the debt ceiling. If federal debt 
reached the statutory ceiling at any given time, and the difference between legislated 
expenditures and tax revenues was, say, $50 billion, then the President would be required 
either to: (1) collect $50 billion more in taxes than Congress had (via the Internal 
Revenue Code) ordered him to collect; (2) spend $50 billion less than Congress had (via 
the appropriations laws) ordered him to spend; or (3) borrow $50 billion more than 
Congress had (via the debt ceiling statute) authorized him to borrow. 
Because each prong of the trilemma would require the President to usurp an 
enumerated power of Congress, any path that the President chose would violate the 
Constitution. We argued, however, that it was possible to rank the three unconstitutional 
choices, and we concluded that the president would do the least constitutional damage by 																																																								
133 See Lori Montgomery, Brady Dennis & Alec MacGillis, Origins of the debt Showdown, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 6, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/origins-of-the-debt-
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134 See Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 8, at 1176-1196. 
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137 See supra, note 8. 
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honoring Congress’s commands regarding spending and taxing, which he could only do 
by setting aside Congress’s contradictory command regarding debt. If Congress disagreed 
with the president’s choice to borrow the necessary amount of money to avoid a default 
on the government’s obligations, it retained the power to change future spending and tax 
levels to achieve the level of debt that it desired. 
The conventional wisdom in policy circles holds that faced with a shortfall caused 
by reaching the debt ceiling limit, the president ought to unilaterally withhold payment on 
spending obligations as they come due, but we argued (and still contend) that this 
conventional wisdom is wrong. For the president to arrogate to himself the power to 
change Congress’s spending priorities—honoring some of Congress’s expressed wishes 
while frustrating others—would undo so much of the legislative branch’s negotiated 
compromises that the constitutional structure cannot permit it. As now-Chief Justice 
Roberts once wrote: “Separation of powers is a zero-sum game. If one branch 
unconstitutionally aggrandizes itself, it is at the expense of the other branches.”138 The 
degree of executive aggrandizement that would follow from a president’s decision to re-
set Congress’s spending priorities is simply too great, compared to the alternatives. The 
president should not be allowed or expected to use the debt ceiling statute as a reason to 
ignore Congress’s hard-fought budgetary compromises, and instead to decide which bills 
to pay and which to ignore or delay. 
Notwithstanding our analysis, the White House has endorsed the conventional 
wisdom that the president would have no choice but to usurp Congress’s spending power 
by refusing to make required payments to the government’s obligees, if Congress ever 
fails to make a timely adjustment in the debt ceiling.139 This decision might well be based 
on savvy political strategizing. For example, the White House might fear that the 
president could be accused of “wanting to borrow money,” or that he has “blown through 
the debt ceiling,” or similar baseless—but potentially potent—political attacks. Whatever 
the political reasons, however, there is no evidence that the Obama administration was 
ever seriously contemplating following our advice. 
President Obama did, however, change his political strategy after losing his first 
debt ceiling battle, in the summer of 2011. Rather than accepting the idea that an increase 
in the debt ceiling was a desirable goal in itself, for which he had to pay a political price, 
he pointed out (correctly) that the debt ceiling must be increased simply in order to 
prevent the federal government from defaulting on obligations to which it was already 
legally committed. To be able to “pay our bills,” the president took the position that the 
debt ceiling was non-negotiable. Neither side wanted to increase the debt ceiling, as a 
matter of policy commitments, but both sides were responsible for increasing it to the 
level that would be required to allow the nation’s obligations to be met. The president 
thus drew a line in the sand, saying that he would accept only a “clean” debt ceiling 
increase, and that he would not negotiate over unrelated issues in order to adjust the 
nominal limit in the debt ceiling statute. 140 																																																								
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As far as it went, the president’s revised approach was clearly correct. The debt 
ceiling statute is simply not relevant to determining how much debt the government 
issues. Members of Congress who (wrongly, in our view) think that the deficit should be 
zero, or who even believe that the debt should be paid down (which would require annual 
surpluses, probably for decades to come) have the legislative means necessary to make 
that happen, through the normal budgetary process. The debt ceiling is thus not about 
changing the amount of debt, but about making it impossible to finance the debt that 
Congress has already put in place. 
As we argued in our most recent article, once there are spending and taxing laws 
in place that imply the need for deficit financing, the government will have to take on that 
new debt by issuing formal Treasury securities, or it will instead borrow the money 
without calling it debt, by telling its obligees that they must wait to be paid. Either way, 
once the spending and taxing laws have been passed, the die is cast, and the debt will rise 
above the level specified in the debt ceiling statute, whether Republicans in Congress 
admit it or not. The only way around this conclusion, we noted, would be for the 
President to take the radical (and unconstitutional, even on the narrowest reading of the 
relevant provisions) step of repudiating its obligations outright.141 
In that sense, then, the president was correct to say that Congress has no choice 
under the Constitution but to increase the debt ceiling when appropriate (or, even better, 
to repeal the debt ceiling statute entirely), and to stop trying to use that law as a political 
battering ram. 
In addition, as a matter of political strategy, one could understand why the 
president would loudly announce his new commitment not to sign a bill raising the debt 
ceiling if it includes any other provisions. As in the deadly game of “chicken,” such a 
“stare-down strategy,” as we call it, can only work if the other side knows in advance that 
the president is fully committed in advance to staying the course. The congressional 
Republicans’ only choice at that point is to test the president’s level of commitment. As it 
happens, President Obama’s opponents did indeed blink each time that a debt ceiling 
increase has been required in the post-2011 era, agreeing each time to increase the debt 
ceiling (or, in some cases, to “suspend” the debt ceiling temporarily, and then re-set the 
limit to a higher level when the ceiling is later reinstated) and thus avoid a default on the 
government’s obligations. In that sense, the President “won” the post-2011 debt ceiling 
standoffs. However, there is no guarantee that his successor will prevail in future 
standoffs, the first of which could occur in early 2017, when the debt ceiling will next 
need to be raised.142 Ominously, in February 2016, House Republicans released a report 
that strongly suggests that they continue to think that failure to raise the debt ceiling 
would impose no special hardship—and certainly no constitutional crisis—for the 
executive branch: they apparently regard the stare-down strategy as a bluff that they are 
now prepared to call.143 																																																								
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142 See Joseph Lawler, Deal would suspend debt ceiling until after 2017 inauguration, WASH. EXAM’R 
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/deal-would-suspend-debt-ceiling-until-after-2017-
inauguration/article/2574984. 
143 See Staff Report: The Obama Administration’s Debt Ceiling Subterfuge: Subpoeanaed Documents 
Reveal Treasury Misled Public in Attempt to “Maximize Pressure on Congress”, Committee on Financial 
Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/debt_ceiling_report_final_01292015.pdf. As the report’s 
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Thus, there was and continues to be an enormous danger inherent in the stare-
down strategy. Imagine that the next president secretly agrees with our analysis, and thus 
that she would be willing—if Congress ultimately refuses to blink during a future stare-
down—to issue new debt in order to honor Congress’s dictates regarding spending and 
taxing. At what point would the president be able to announce that she is going to issue 
new debt? Announcing her fallback strategy before the very last second would allow 
opponents in Congress to blame her in exactly the way that she would hope not to be 
blamed, which would supposedly weaken her in the competition for public approval (and 
of finger pointing). Meanwhile, the stare-down strategy’s likelihood of working is at its 
highest as the clock ticks toward midnight on the drop-dead date, as congressional 
opponents become convinced that the president will refuse to blink. 
Yet waiting until the witching hour to announce the issuance of debt-ceiling-
violating debt would create serious technical implementation issues. Normally, the sale of 
new debt securities in a standard bond auction (which is the method by which the federal 
government borrows money) is announced weeks in advance, and the process plays out 
over hours or days. If the president is strategically committed to waiting until the last 
possible second, however, she would be unable to authorize the necessary auction in time 
to prevent a default. The federal government must pay bills that come due every day, and 
if sufficient tax revenues do not come in on that day, abiding by the debt ceiling would 
leave the Treasury with no way to pay the people to whom the government owes money. 
On the drop-dead date, bills would come due that could only be paid by borrowing 
money; yet the money would not yet have been borrowed, and it would be logistically 
impossible to hold a timely bond auction. 
Importantly, when we describe such an event as a “first-ever” default on the 
government’s obligations, we also mean to emphasize the gravity of such an 
unprecedented event. The U.S. government is considered the safest borrower in the 
world, and its reputation for sound finances is based on the fact that no one has ever been 
denied payment in full on the date that the federal government has legally committed to 
making a payment. The United States has never said, “sorry, I’ll get it to you in a few 
days.” People and businesses to which the government owes money count on timely and 
complete payments, and they make further commitments on that basis. Missing payments 
by even a day is no small matter. 
In short, the stakes in a debt ceiling stare-down are incalculably high. The federal 
government’s future ability to borrow, to enter into contracts, and its very ability to 
continue to conduct its affairs in a businesslike fashion would be harmed by any failure to 
pay its obligations. That is not to say that people would henceforth refuse to do business 
with the government, or to lend it money, but just like any other borrower with a 
tarnished credit rating, the government would see its future borrowing costs rise. And the 
shame of it is that these increased costs to be borne by taxpayers are completely 
avoidable. 
Therefore, the danger of a presidential debt ceiling stare-down strategy is that, if 
neither side blinks, it would be too late for the president to adopt a new strategy that 
would both minimize the constitutional violation and save the nation’s creditworthiness. 																																																																																																																																																																					
title indicates, House Republicans believe that the Obama administration had contingent plans to prioritize 
payments, and that the stare-down strategy was therefore a bluff. 
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Fortunately, there is one way out. Unfortunately, the consequences of relying on the 
needed deus ex machina would be extraordinarily high. 
C. The Dangers of Requiring the Fed to Use Its Full Powers 
 
As we described above, the Federal Reserve’s most important duty is to protect 
the financial markets, and ultimately the economy. Usually, this means that it must act as 
the lender of last resort for financial institutions, as we described in sub-Part A, above. 
Here, however, we see the possibility that the Fed could be the only lender that could act 
quickly enough to prevent the debt ceiling from creating a default on some of the 
government’s obligations. 
The Fed’s concern in this instance would not only be based on the idea that the 
government’s future borrowing costs would rise in the aftermath of a default. The Fed 
would also be required to consider the immediate effects on financial markets, if the 
United States were to default on any of its legally required payments between the 
expiration of the deadline to raise the debt ceiling and when a sale on the open market of 
what we have previously called “Presidential bonds” could be implemented.144 Even 
assuming that banks, foreign governments, and other financial players could eventually 
be found to buy the bonds (at an appropriate interest premium reflecting the cloud on 
their legality), such purchases would come too late to avoid default. In the meantime, 
financial actors, both at home and abroad, would likely respond to the initial default by 
taking protective measures, reducing their exposure and thus cutting off financial 
transactions that they would otherwise have been quite willing to consummate. The risk 
of financial contagion would be quite real. 
In these circumstances, the Fed might well decide that it should intervene and 
immediately buy the new bonds itself. It would need to purchase enough Treasury 
securities—at midnight on the drop-dead date—to allow the federal government to avoid 
its first-ever default. For these purposes, the Fed’s independent status is key, because it 
counts as “the public” when it buys securities from the Treasury. Although it would be 
buying those securities—that is, lending to the government—with money that it created 
of its own volition, that would not be extraordinary, and there is nothing about the Fed’s 
actions here that would be any different from any other time that it indirectly increases 
the money supply (such as its standard approach to lowering interest rates in the face of a 
weak economy). The important point is that the Treasury would receive the money that it 
needs to pay all of its obligees, in full and on time. 
Here, of course, the Fed would know that there are no good choices. The markets 
would be in some amount of turmoil in any event, and the Fed’s intervention would itself 
create uncertainty (and no small amount of acrimony). However, because the Fed is the 
only institution that would be capable of acting fast enough and decisively enough to 
prevent the country from permanently damaging its credit rating, we would expect the 
politically independent Fed to step in to save the day, and to save the nation from the 																																																								
144 In our first article, we coined the term “Presidential bonds” to emphasize that the president would 
need to issue Treasury securities that had not been authorized by Congress. See Buchanan & Dorf, How to 
Choose, supra note 8, at 1209. Because that distinction is not the focus of our analysis here, we will not 
continue to use that term. Instead, we simply point out that the president would be required to issue new 
bonds, in order to borrow enough money to pay the bills that Congress’s previous spending and taxing laws 
require. 
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irresponsible actions of those politicians who would have tried to use an unconstitutional 
statute to achieve political ends that they cannot otherwise achieve. 
Indeed, we believe that the Fed would be required to buy the Treasury’s new 
bonds in such a situation, in order to meet its primary responsibility of protecting the 
stability of the financial markets. But even if we are wrong, and the people who are then 
in charge of the Fed choose not to intervene, that would merely mean that they have 
concluded that the consequences of a first-ever default are outweighed by other 
considerations. Having an institution in place that possesses the political independence 
that would allow it at least to consider following our advice—rather than being subject to 
political supervision—is precisely why we believe that the Fed’s independence is so 
important in a crisis. It might not always make the tough calls that other people might 
want it to make, but it would nonetheless be empowered to act on its best judgment. 
Note, however, that even if the Fed were to follow our advice, the debt limit 
would still have been breached, precisely because the Fed counts as “the public” when it 
lends money to the government, and it would be holding more Treasury securities than it 
held before, increasing the total outstanding debt above the statutory limit. Nonetheless, 
as we noted above, that ship would have sailed when Congress enacted spending and 
taxing laws that imply borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling. The president would still 
have faced a trilemma, and she would thus violate the Constitution’s separation of powers 
by authorizing the Treasury Department to borrow money from the Fed. As we have 
emphasized, however, because this is the least unconstitutional of the president’s three 
options, it is the least bad choice from a set of only bad options. And at the point where it 
became clear that the stare-down strategy had resulted in a stalemate, the Fed would be 
the only institution that could allow the president to come close to meeting her 
constitutional obligations—and, of course, to minimizing the damage to the financial 
system and the economy. 
Even so, if the Fed were to follow our advice, it would open itself up to charges 
that it had taken sides with the president in a partisan fight. Even though it would not 
have made its decision for political reasons, it would have been forced to choose to anger 
either Republicans or Democrats. And this is no small matter. As we described in Part II, 
the Fed is already under constant attack for its activities, with “end the Fed” and “audit 
the Fed” efforts now afoot in Congress, as the latest incarnations of the undying distrust 
of central banks that seems always to exist just outside the political mainstream. 
Here, the action that the Fed would be obligated to take—buying bonds that have 
not been authorized by Congress in order to prevent a federal default—would not only 
stoke the fears of “unaccountable” bankers working behind the scenes, but would also 
feed into one of the central complaints on the political right: that the Fed is “enabling the 
growth of the federal debt.”145 As noted above, the Fed carries out its mandate to control 
interest rates and monetary aggregates by buying and selling Treasury securities. It would 
be possible for the Fed instead to buy private financial assets such as corporate stocks and 
bonds, but it is difficult to imagine that this would make the Fed’s populist critics feel 
any better. After all, do they really want the Fed to hold ownership stakes in corporate 
America, or to be a creditor to American businesses? 																																																								
145 Binyamin Applebaum, Challenged on Left and Right, the Fed Faces a Decision on Rates, N.Y. TIMES 
A1 (Aug. 31, 2015). 
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In any event, the current reality is that the Fed pushes new money into the 
financial system by buying and holding U.S. Treasury securities. This, in turn, can easily 
be mischaracterized as “fund[ing] Washington’s deficit spending.”146 Even though the 
debt ceiling itself has nothing to do with the growth of the debt, the superficial logic 
would go something like this: The Fed already finances the debt. The Democrats want 
more debt. The debt ceiling would stop them from issuing it. The president is refusing to 
negotiate to reduce spending and thus reduce the debt. The Fed has just proved that it is 
on the president’s side by allowing her to illegally ignore the debt ceiling. 
This possibility suggests that the Fed could have to choose between following its 
best judgment and maintaining its political independence. The Fed might well agree with 
us that the best measure to take, should Congress insist on creating a trilemma for the 
president, is to buy the new Treasury securities that would be issued on the drop-dead 
date. Yet it would have to weigh against that policy judgment the possibility that it could 
be signing its own death warrant, because enraged opponents could seize on its actions to 
justify legislation curtailing Fed independence or eliminating the Fed entirely. 
In short, the possibility that some members of Congress will again force a debt-
ceiling showdown, combined with the decision of a future president to use a stare-down 
strategy, could result in a crisis that is in some sense tailor-made for an independent 
central bank to step in and solve. Yet the result of such a situation could be either that the 
Fed does the right thing at the expense of its own independence, or that it does the wrong 
thing to protect that independence. Given the stakes, and the importance of the Fed in 
serving as an independent but accountable institution, it would be better if the Fed were 
never to face such a choice. 
We are aware, of course, that in some sense our analysis here could be used as a 
roadmap to guarantee the Fed’s destruction. For someone who is determined to “end the 
Fed,” after all, we have described how a deliberately concocted debt-ceiling crisis could 
not only serve the purpose of putting the president in a political bind, but it could also set 
in motion the Fed’s final demise. We have no doubt that there are those who would be 
willing to bet the country’s future and roll the dice (although we dearly hope that there 
are not enough of those people actually to make it happen). Even so, we do not view our 
roll as analyzing an issue but then hiding unwelcome conclusions. Moreover, our analysis 
here shows even more clearly why a president’s decision to adopt a stare-down strategy, 
rather than confronting well in advance of a debt ceiling standoff the reality that the debt 
ceiling statute is unconstitutional, is such a dangerous game. 
Beyond the cautionary tale that comes from this possible series of events, the 
larger issue is whether the Fed should continue to exist as an independent policy actor. 
This really boils down to the question of whether we want the Fed to be able to exercise 
human judgment. Although we would never want the Fed to be forced to decide whether 
to rescue the economy during a debt ceiling standoff, that it could do so serves as an 
important example demonstrating the unique role that the Fed serves in the U.S. political 
and economic system. It is precisely when the political branches are incapable of 
responding to a crisis—either because of the rush of events, or because the political 																																																								
146Ylan Q. Mui, Conservatives Have Failed to End the Fed, but They’re not Giving up Hope, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/09/02/conservatives-have-
failed-to-end-the-fed-but-theyre-not-giving-up-hope/ (noting various criticisms of the Fed, including its 
supposed funding of deficit spending). 
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process has ground to a halt—that we would most need a politically independent Fed to 
do what otherwise could not be done. 
IV.  Justifying Fed Independence 
 
 We have just seen the value of Fed independence in a crisis—both a recent real 
one and a potential near-future one. Yet the Fed acts as an independent agency in normal 
times as well during crises. Can Fed independence be justified in normal times? 
In our view, during the years since the financial crisis the Fed made better 
macroeconomic policy choices than the political branches did. Whereas the latter 
deployed expansionary fiscal policy too timidly during the crisis and then pivoted to 
deficit reduction well before the economy had fully recovered, the Fed pursued an 
aggressive, expansionary monetary policy.147 Yet the fact that an expert agency pursues 
better policies than those pursued by political actors is not, standing alone, a sufficient 
reason to insulate that agency from political supervision. If it were, then we would have 
reasons to favor technocracy presumptively across a wide range of subject matter areas. 
Accordingly, the case for Fed independence in ordinary times must rest on 
something beyond the superior economic competence of Fed economists relative to 
elected officials. Conventionally, that something is thought to be the risk that, if given 
control over monetary policy, elected officials—especially the president—will use that 
control to boost the economy in the short term so that the voters reward them, even as the 
best approach for the long-term health of the economy would be tighter money. Yet the 
experience of recent years reverses the conventional wisdom. More commonly now, 
elected officials favor tighter monetary policy than the Fed. 148  The conventional 
justification for Fed independence in normal times appears to be out of date. 
This Part nonetheless defends Fed independence by emphasizing that times 
change. No one thinks that Americans’ generally healthy regard for freedom of speech 
justifies eliminating the First Amendment, so, likewise, the fact that we live in a period 
when the roles of the Fed and political actors are upside-down does not mean that the 
traditional relation will not reappear. A structural defense of institutional independence 
should be based on the long-term incentives of the actors. In elaborating this point, we 
draw on an analogy between an independent judiciary and an independent central bank. 
We also emphasize a distinctive justification for Fed independence based on our 
consideration of the Fed’s performance in recent years and its potential role in responding 
to future crises.149 Fed independence from the political branches of the government does 
not merely enable the Fed to check them or to act on its own. Rather, Fed independence 
facilitates cooperation with the rest of the government because the Fed can act as a 
financial counter-party to the political parts of the government (especially Treasury), in 
both normal times and emergency times. 																																																								
147 Marc Labonte, Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve: Current Policy and Issues for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, Report 7-5700, 13-17 (June 18, 2015). 
148 Matt O’Brien, Why Republicans are getting one of the most obvious things wrong, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/10/why-republicans-are-
getting-one-of-the-most-obvious-things-wrong/; see also Michael Grunwald, Republicans Want Us To Be 
Europe, TIME (Apr 3, 2014), http://time.com/49010/republicans-want-us-to-be-europe/. 
149 See supra Part II. 
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A.  From Expertise to Self-Dealing 
 
In an important speech two decades ago, administrative law scholar Peter Strauss 
explained how, over time, the chief rationale for delegation of substantial power to 
administrative agencies shifted from expertise—the notion that complex technical 
questions call for solutions fashioned by objective experts—to politics—the recognition 
that agencies make policy choices constrained by public input and presidential 
supervision.150 The leading administrative law doctrine of our era, Chevron deference, 
reflects that shift: In the eponymous case, the Supreme Court sustained the Reagan 
administration’s loosening of the emissions rules governing power plants on the ground 
that, within the broad linguistic bounds of the relevant statutory delegation, an agency 
may (indeed must) make policy choices, but that ultimate supervision by the president 
ensures political accountability for those choices.151 
To be sure, comparative expertise continues to play a role in justifying delegation 
to administrative agencies. When Congress paints with a broad brush, the case law 
assumes that, other things being equal, it intends that agency experts rather than 
generalist judges will fill in the details.152 
In addition, recent scholarship calls attention to an institutional dimension to 
agency expertise. In the traditional picture, courts (and others) would give epistemic 
deference to experts because, in virtue of their training and experience, they know more 
about the underlying technical issues than the layperson. The new work on agency 
expertise supplements this view of expertise “in the air” by describing how specialized 
training and experience interact with a particular institutional setting. As Matthew 
Stephenson helpfully summarizes this perspective using what he himself calls “the jargon 
of modern social science, public decision makers’ expertise about policy decisions is 
often endogenous (produced by factors internal to the legal-institutional system) rather 
than exogenous (determined by factors external to, and therefore independent of, legal-
institutional design choices).”153 In other words, agencies do not merely collect experts 
under one roof where they exercise their pre-existing expertise; the agency and its 
professional staff co-produce expertise. 																																																								
150  See Peter Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755—56 (1996) (describing shift in 1960s and 1970s as reflecting “a general 
social trend that came to view agencies less as apolitical “experts” administering a strictly rational process, 
and more as political bodies making choices among alternatives in response to social needs 
and political inputs). 
151 The Court stated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1983), 
that “an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of 
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its 
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is 
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .” 
152 See id. (“Judges are not experts in the field”); Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 
2254, 2265 n.7 (2011) (explaining, in the course of deferring to Federal Communications Commission’s 
(FCC’s) construction of its own rule that the existence of a “technical factual dispute” between the parties 
“simply underscores the appropriateness of deferring to the FCC [because s]o long as the Commission is 
acting within the scope of its delegated authority and in accordance with prescribed procedures, it has 
greater expertise and stands in a better position than this Court to make the technical and policy judgments 
necessary to administer the complex regulatory program at issue here.”) 
153  Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 
1426 (2011). 
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This new attention to how agencies produce and exercise expertise arguably 
justifies restoring some of the lost luster of expertise as a justification for both delegation 
of authority to agencies and judicial deference to agency decision making. At the same 
time, however, the factors that Strauss identified as leading to the earlier shift from 
expertise to politics have hardly disappeared. Agencies remain susceptible to capture by 
the industries they regulate,154 and many decisions delegated to agencies involve trading 
off values that are matters of political contestation. Perhaps the most that can be said is 
that the case for delegation and deference to agencies rests on an uncertain and context-
dependent mix of expertise and politics. 
We take no position on the precise proportions of that mix in any given setting or 
more broadly. Our point here is that, whatever the mix in any particular context, 
something extra must be offered to justify structuring an agency to be relatively 
independent of political oversight. In principle, that something could be the 
extraordinarily technical nature of the underlying subject matter, but in practice, that sort 
of justification cannot explain the haphazard pattern of supervision that Congress has in 
fact devised. Indeed, there is not even agreement on which agencies count as 
independent155 or whether one can sensibly draw a sharp distinction between independent 
and executive-branch agencies.156 
But even treating “independence” as a matter of degree rather than kind, it is plain 
that the degree to which the relevant regulatory subject matter calls for technical skill 
cannot, by itself, explain why Congress chooses to make some agencies more or less 
politically accountable. For example, environmental regulation requires extraordinarily 
complex scientific judgments; yet the Administrator and deputy Administrators of the 
Environmental Protection Agency are political appointees heading an agency within the 
executive branch.157 Likewise, the Energy Department, which has responsibility for many 
																																																								
154 See Strauss, supra note 150, at 756 (describing risk of capture as an important part of the process by 
which agency decision making came to be seen as political). 
155  See MIROSLAVA SCHOLTEN, THE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF EU AND US INDEPENDENT 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 200—01  (2014) (noting that “no general definition of ‘independent regulatory 
agency’ exists” but nonetheless listing sixteen such agencies based on the list set forth by statute, 44 U.S.C. 
§ 3502, and objective indicia of independence such as “multi-member management boards, bipartisan 
criteria for appointment and the removal ‘for cause’ restriction”); Note: The SEC is not an Independent 
Agency, 126 HARV. L. REV. 781 (2013) (arguing that members of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, which appears on Scholten’s list of independent agencies, do not enjoy for-cause dismissal 
protection and that the Commission is thus not independent). 
156 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) (arguing that “conventional discussion of administrative law and agency design 
has overlooked [the fact] that the traditional metrics for an independent agency” ignore various structural 
means of insulating agencies); Kirti Datla and Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies 
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013) (finding that no list of functional criteria 
satisfactorily distinguishes executive from independent agencies and concluding that independence should 
be regarded as a multi-factor matter of degree, not kind); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency 
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2013) (arguing that “unwritten political norms” or 
“conventions,” rather than criteria such as insulation of agency personnel from removal by the president, 
define which agencies are “independent”). 
157  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1972); see also, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (identifying the 
total maximum daily loads (TMDL) and individual water quality-based effluent limitations). 
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highly technical matters,158  is an executive agency. At the same time, however, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have 
the usual indicia of independent agencies.159 
Thus, the technical skill needed to regulate an area cannot have been the decisive 
criterion in Congress’s decisions whether to make particular agencies subject to direct 
political control versus relatively independent. And accordingly, the need for technical 
expertise does not provide a sufficient explanation for the Fed’s independence. Yes, 
regulation of the macro-economy through the purchase and sale of financial assets 
requires considerable technical expertise, but certainly not more technical expertise than 
the sorts of tasks undertaken by some more politically accountable agencies. 
In any event, strictly as a normative matter, the need for expertise should not 
suffice as a reason for an agency’s independence from political oversight. To justify 
creating an independent agency, Congress should have some special reason beyond 
subject matter difficulty. Otherwise, given the complexity of just about everything, 
Congress would be justified in delegating nearly all regulation to independent agencies. 
We recognize that virtually no body of constitutional doctrine governs the 
question of when Congress can, and when it cannot, delegate power to an independent as 
opposed to an executive-branch agency. The issue arises, if at all, only indirectly, 
typically in cases challenging congressional restrictions on the president’s power to 
remove officers wielding government power.160 Yet those cases make no serious effort to 
distinguish between the sorts of business that can be assigned to agency officials who are 
relatively insulated from political pressure and those that must be entrusted to officials 
directly answerable to the president.161 
Accordingly, when we ask whether Fed independence can be justified, we do not 
mean to inquire whether Fed independence is constitutionally permissible. Under the 
current doctrine, the answer to that question is pretty clearly yes. Perhaps the doctrine 
ought to be modified so that, in Gillian Metzger’s turn of phrase, the president has a 
“duty to supervise” the administrative state.162 If so, that duty might be calibrated to take 
account of the particular mission and characteristics of each of the various agencies of 
government. 
For present purposes, however, our task is sufficiently complicated even when we 
employ the simplifying assumption that there are just two kinds of agencies: executive 
agencies that answer to the president and independent agencies that are less directly 
accountable to political oversight. Any plausible classificatory scheme would put the Fed 																																																								
158 For example, the Department of Energy has responsibility for managing nuclear weapons and nuclear 
energy. See Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation, http://energy.gov/public-services/national-security-
safety/nuclear-security-nonproliferation (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). 
159 See SCHOLTEN, supra note 155, at 200. 
160  See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) 
(invalidating double level of for-cause protection for members of board created by Sarbanes-Oxley Act); 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding restrictions on removal of independent counsel). 
161 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), which invalidated restrictions on the president’s power to 
fire a postmaster, is an exception, as the Court there reasoned that all principal officers exercising executive 
power must be subject to direct presidential removal, but the logic of Myers has not been followed in 
subsequent cases. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 723-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
162  Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1842-43 (2015) 
(rooting such a duty in the Take Care Clause and separation of powers, notwithstanding worries about 
judicial competence). 
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in the second category. Accordingly, when we ask whether Fed independence is justified 
we mean simply whether Congress had a good reason for thinking that the Fed needs the 
kind of independence it enjoys163—that is, whether the Fed is special in some way. This 
is why, in order to avoid the slippery slope to technocracy tout court, a good answer 
would have to point to something other than the expertise of Fed economists. 
The standard answer in the literature on the Fed (and central banks more 
generally) is the risk that politicians will manipulate the money supply for short-term 
political ends at the expense of long-term economic health.164 In the United States, the 
clearest example is the pressure that President Richard Nixon applied to Fed Chair Arthur 
Burns. 165  That Nixon was able to apply such pressure notwithstanding the Fed’s 
institutional insulation only underscores the danger we would face if the Fed were subject 
to direct political control. 
The next sub-Part raises questions about the continuing vitality of this 
justification for Fed independence, but for now we note that it bears a strong structural 
resemblance to the standard justification for an independent judiciary with the power of 
judicial review. Constitutions mark the boundaries of government’s authority—whether 
at the border of other branches or levels of government or of individual rights—and so 
there is a risk of self-dealing if the very government officials whose actions a constitution 
constrains have final authority over the meaning of the constitution. That risk is perhaps 
least tolerable when, in John Hart Ely’s memorable phrase, “the ins are choking off the 
channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.”166 
Ely’s justificatory account of judicial review by an independent judiciary 
translates to the Fed quite tightly. If left to their own devices, incumbent presidents—the 
ins—will use the levers of monetary policy to stay in and to keep challengers out. The 
worry also applies to a second-term president, who would be tempted to froth up the 
economy in the hope of aiding in the election of a successor from the same political 
party. 
In at least one way, Ely’s worry about the ins favoring their political interests over 
the interests of the public in general carries even greater urgency with respect to 
monetary policy by the Fed than with respect to judicial review by an independent 																																																								
163 At the risk of stating the obvious, we mean independence from the president and Congress. Rachel 
Barkow has argued that insulating agencies from direct control by political actors can be a means of 
avoiding agency capture, that is, of making the agency independent of the influence of private actors. See 
Barkow, supra note 156, at 17. We take no firm position on whether avoiding capture justifies agency 
independence, but we do note that this interest would not appear to provide the “something extra” that we 
believe is needed, because there is a risk that just about any agency will be captured. Perhaps, however, 
some agencies are substantially more vulnerable to capture than others. If so, this greater susceptibility 
might warrant independence. 
164 Conti-Brown explains that this picture is widely known through two metaphors: Ulysses bound to the 
mast to resist the sirens’ song; and the Fed Chair as the chaperone who removes the spiked punch bowl just 
when the party is heating up. See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 20, passim (repeatedly referring to the 
“Ulysses/punch-bowl” view of Fed independence); id. at 3 (ascribing the punch bowl metaphor to William 
McChesney Martin, who served as Fed Chair for nearly two decades). 
165 Burton A. Abrams, How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes, 
20(4) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 177 (2006). 
166 ELY, supra, note 26, at 103 (1980). Ely described political malfunction justifying judicial intervention 
as occurring either when the ins abuse their power to hold it or when “representatives beholden to an 
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or [prejudice].” 
Id. We focus here on the former rationale. 
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judiciary. Politicians unconstrained by Ely-style representation-reinforcing judicial 
review will have incentives to rig the political process to give themselves an electoral 
advantage. Consequently, any policy chosen by the resulting unrepresentative 
government officials can be said to be bad on process grounds, but the rigging of the 
system will not systematically lead to substantively bad policy. By contrast, the rigging 
of monetary policy to benefit incumbents will not only distort electoral results, but will 
also systematically yield bad policy outcomes because it will bias monetary policy in 
favor of loose credit, even when tighter credit would be the preferable course on strictly 
economic grounds. These two concerns—the risk of self-dealing and the tendency of 
such self-dealing to lead to bad monetary policy—together provide the something extra 
that we have said is needed to justify Fed independence. 
To be sure, “self dealing” is a relative term. In some sense anything the 
government does carries a risk of some sort of self dealing. For example, if the 
government borrows irresponsibly to fund short-term consumption rather than long-term 
investment, that choice can benefit incumbents, because only the satiated consumers of 
the here and now vote in the next election. Or the president (with or without 
congressional authorization or acquiescence) can wage an unnecessary war to create a 
rally-round-the flag effect that benefits her or her party in the next election, while 
imposing future costs on service members, their families, taxpayers, and the general 
public whose security may be undermined by later blowback. 
Nonetheless, the risks of self dealing with respect to monetary policy are 
sufficiently different in degree from some other risks of self dealing to warrant treating 
them as different in kind. The irresponsible use of monetary policy poses a risk of 
catastrophic harm, as the history of countries that have experienced hyper-inflation 
confirms. Most other sorts of self dealing—such as pork barrel spending—may be 
wasteful and foolish, but do not risk catastrophe. 
To be sure, there are risks of catastrophic harm in some other domains. To stick 
with the clearest example, the use of military force may pose the risk of escalation to 
nuclear war. The decision to abandon policies favoring alternative energy and instead to 
tap some potent carbon-based resource could tip the balance towards irreversible and 
catastrophic climate change. Accordingly, if we were designing American public 
institutions from scratch, we might conclude that one or more of the agencies responsible 
for policy in these areas ought to be insulated from direct political control as well. An 
“independent military” is certainly a conceptual possibility.167 
However, we are not designing our institutions from scratch. The Commander-in-
Chief clause of the Constitution we have plainly requires that the military be subject to 
direct presidential control. Moreover, even if the Constitution did not rule out an 
independent military, the risk of catastrophic harm from self dealing by political actors in 
the military context must be weighed against other risks. A military not subject to direct 
political control could increase the risk of a coup d’état. Even apart from that risk, on the 
whole, political accountability of the military may actually reduce the risk of catastrophic 
																																																								
167 Cf. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS, Belknap Press 84 (1957) (asserting that the state should encourage “an independent 
military sphere” so that “multifarious civilian groups” would not “maximize their power in military affairs” 
by involving the military in political activity).  
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harm. The Framers’ distrust of standing armies168 and the decision to give Congress a 
role in the decision to go to war—together with the Kantian observation that democracies 
rarely go to war, at least against each other 169 —provide reasons to think that an 
independent military would be, on net, harmful. 
Meanwhile and conversely, there is yet another reason for thinking that monetary 
policy in the hands of directly politically accountable actors would be especially 
vulnerable to the risk of self dealing. More than almost any other policy area with 
systemic effects, monetary policy is opaque to ordinary Americans. If a president “wags 
the dog” by engaging in politically motivated war, or Congress promotes the coal 
industry, what is happening will be clear enough to anyone paying attention. By contrast, 
manipulation of monetary policy can often fly under the public’s radar, especially given 
the diversity of opinion about where interest rates should be set at any particular moment. 
In any event, it is not our aim here to show that monetary policy is uniquely suited 
for an independent agency. If the sorts of factors we have identified that justify 
independence for the Fed (or other relevant factors) justify the conclusion that, all things 
considered, some other agencies also ought to be insulated from direct political control, 
so be it. Our claim is simply that something extra should justify independence for any 
agency, and that the Fed, more than many agencies operating in other policy areas, 
satisfies that requirement, because of the special risks of self dealing involved in 
monetary policy if conducted by politicians or people directly accountable to politicians. 
Indeed, far from justifying too many independent agencies, our requirement of a 
special justification for making an agency independent might prove problematic for many 
of the existing independent agencies. Independence for some agencies perhaps could be 
justified on the ground that they address acute versions of the self-dealing concern. For 
others, one might enlist other sorts of reasons, some of which might also apply to the Fed 
itself. For example, independent agencies often include representatives from the private 
sector in order to attain some of the advantages of industry self-regulation.170 To render 
an agency answerable to the private sector, even in part, is necessarily to render it 
relatively independent of political control. But whether this or some other sort of 
justification can be found for every independent agency is beyond the scope of this 
																																																								
168 The concern loomed largest among the Anti-Federalists. See, e.g., THE ANTI-FEDERALIST No. 10 
(Brutus). The Framers responded by acknowledging the dangers of standing armies but denying that the 
Constitution would lead to a standing army. See, e.g., THE FEDERALISTS Nos. 8, 26, 29 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
169 See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 93 (H.S. Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbett trans., 2d ed. 1991) (setting forth conditions needed to avoid 
war, including republican government) Modern theorists contest the democratic peace hypothesis. Compare 
Sebastian Rosato, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, 97(4) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 585 (2003) 
(critiquing the claim that democracies do not go to war with each other), with Michael W. Doyle, Three 
Pillars of the Liberal Peace, 99(3) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 463 (2005) (responding with a qualified defense of 
the democratic peace thesis). Although we agree with Doyle and others that, ceteris paribus, representative 
government reduces the risk of war, our point here is more limited—namely, that a policy maker or 
constitution writer could reasonably conclude that control of the military by elected officials reduces the 
risk of war. 
170 For a cautious endorsement of the advantages of self-regulation in some contexts, see Michael C. Dorf 
and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 373—388 
(1998) (discussing statutes that encourage environmental self-regulation).  
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Article. 171  Our focus is on the Fed, for which the self-dealing rationale apparently 
suffices. 
B.  Pathology and Spandrels 
 
Or does it? Perhaps the standard justification for Fed independence is passé. No 
longer do we see the Fed fighting to maintain the integrity of the currency against a set of 
profligate political actors seeking to add temporary froth to the economy in order to boost 
their standing with the electorate. Instead, as we have noted, the current pattern is just the 
opposite: The political system favors tighter monetary policy than the Fed. Does this role 
reversal mean that Fed independence can no longer be justified? 
We think the answer is no, for there is no reason to think that the political 
branches’ current endorsement of monetary (and fiscal) austerity as the path to prosperity 
is permanent. Institutions like a central bank should be designed with an eye towards the 
long term, and over the long term the incentives of political actors could once again 
unduly bias them towards short-term easy money timed to the political cycle at the 
expense of long-term growth. 
Once again, constitutional law provides a useful analogy. In an important article 
three decades ago, Vincent Blasi argued that in interpreting the First Amendment courts 
ought to be guided by what he called 
 
the pathological perspective. That is, the overriding objective at all times 
should be to equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those 
historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent 
and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent 
systematically. The first amendment, in other words, should be targeted 
for the worst of times.172 
 
Blasi explained that even though pathological periods tend to be short-lived, they can do 
lasting damage, and that the body of free speech doctrine therefore ought to be designed, 
even in ordinary times, with pathological periods in mind.173 Blasi was not so naïve as to 
believe that judicial adoption of the pathological perspective would utterly prevent 
pathological periods, but he thought that conscious adoption of the pathological 
perspective during ordinary times “might help to blunt or delay the impact of 
some pathological pressures, keep a pathology in certain bounds, or stimulate the 																																																								
171 We also do not address arguments that the Constitution requires all agencies to be subject to the 
supervision of the president. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s 
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 582 (1994); (“The exclusivity of the power granted by the 
Executive Power Clause confirms our view that Congress cannot create independent entities under the 
Constitution”); STEVEN G. CALABRESI AND CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); David Casazza, Note: Liberty Requires 
Accountability: Checking Delegations to Independent Agencies, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 729 (2015) 
(arguing that delegations to independent agencies violate the nondelegation doctrine). See also sources 
cited supra, note 83. We take as given that independent agencies are here to stay. 
172 Blasi, supra note 23, at 449—50. 
173 See id. at 458 (characterizing as “remote” the possibility that “the best way to fortify a constitutional 
regime against pathological challenge is to develop a strong tradition of adjudication geared to normal 
times.”). 
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regenerative forces that permit a political community to work its way out of 
a pathological period.”174 
 It is at least arguable that U.S. free speech doctrine—which is stronger relative to 
other governmental objectives than free speech protection in any other country—already 
incorporates something like a pathological perspective. Yet, as Geoffrey Stone has 
shown, the courts have been powerless to prevent, and have often acquiesced in, 
unnecessary curtailments of civil liberties when the nation felt threatened.175 To be sure, 
many of the episodes Stone details pre-dated modern free speech doctrine, although the 
post-9/11 measures did not. 
In any event, for our current purposes, we do not need to take a position on 
whether matters would have been still worse had the courts not adopted the pathological 
perspective in the First Amendment area or, more broadly, whether Blasi’s prescription is 
sound in its own domain. At the very least, there is a logic to Blasi’s argument that could 
be true in any given domain. And that logic translates quite well to monetary policy. 
Whereas Blasi offered the pathological perspective as an attitude for judges 
construing the First Amendment, legislators and constitution writers can also take the 
pathological perspective in designing institutions. Indeed, one might think of a judicially 
enforceable bill of rights as the product of constitution writers (or amenders) who have 
taken the pathological perspective. The sort of polity likely to produce a bill of rights that 
is meant to be taken seriously (by contrast with the rights protections one sees in sham 
constitutions176) will generally be one that, in normal times, is inclined to respect rights 
even without the bill of rights. Although Justice Scalia surely overstated the point when 
he averred that the whole point of a bill of rights is to fortify a society’s deep 
commitments against the possibility that those commitments may be cast aside in a future 
crisis,177 that is certainly part of what a bill of rights does.178 
The same sort of argument justifies Fed independence even in an era when the 
political branches favor tighter monetary policy than the Fed does. So long as politicians 
can manipulate the money supply to favor their short-term interests at the expense of the 
economy’s long-term health, an institutional designer who takes the pathological 
perspective will seek to insulate the central bank from direct political oversight, so as to 
minimize that risk. Just as Blasi noted that robust pathologically-oriented free speech 
doctrine will not be sufficient to prevent all overreactions against civil liberties, so too, an 
independent Fed will not stand up to all political pressure, as the Nixon/Burns episode 
illustrates. But just as the pathological perspective on free speech can nonetheless be 																																																								
174 Id. at 459. 
175 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES (2005) (describing the U.S. curtailment of civil liberties in 
response to perceived threats as overreactions). 
176 See David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV. 863 (2013) (comparing 
the rights-protective elements of constitutions with the human rights records of governments). 
177 See Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 40-41 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997) (describing the purpose of a constitution as a hedge against the possibility that the 
society will “rot”). 
178 See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1633 (2009) 
(acknowledging that “[c]onstitutional rights” sometimes “entrench deep values against future backsliding” 
even though they are “typically established as the culmination of a struggle to change the status quo, rather 
than to enshrine well-accepted fundamental values”). 
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defended on the ground that it may reduce the likelihood and severity of periods of 
unwarranted invasions of civil liberties, so taking the pathological perspective by 
designing an independent Fed can be justified on the ground that it reduces the likelihood 
of political actors bullying the Fed into unwisely increasing the money supply when the 
best long-term economic analysis would call for a tight monetary policy. 
We would add, moreover, that our concern about self-dealing—with preventing 
the “ins” from abusing policymaking power to stay in office and to oust their opponents 
from the offices that the more powerful “ins” currently do not hold—also justifies a 
concern that politicians could manipulate monetary policy toward inappropriate 
tightening, as well as easing. As we described above, the classic concern is that 
incumbents will pump up the economy in order to win elections, but it is in fact possible 
that politicians could instead decide to strangle the economy as a short-term political 
maneuver. 
Why would a politician want to harm the economy? A long line of political 
science research has found that, at least in the United States and Britain, the incumbent 
party’s electoral fate is all but sealed by the direction that the economy is taking in the 
months immediately preceding the election.179 That is, it is not a question of whether 
times are good or bad, but whether the economy is getting better or worse before an 
election. This means that a savvy politician could decide to manufacture a recession early 
in her term, in order to set the stage for the economy to experience a robust recovery as 
the next election looms. 
President Carter, in fact, was criticized for political naiveté, by essentially running this 
strategy in reverse. He nominated a Fed chairman in 1979, Paul Volcker, who 
immediately instituted severe monetary contraction, which meant that Carter and his 
party faced the electorate in 1980 while presiding over a weakening economy.180 
We take no position on whether this reductionist view of economic cause and 
political effect is true or false. Instead, we simply note that some incumbents could 
believe that it is true, and if those politicians had the ability to control or unduly influence 
monetary policy, they would have the means and motive to use contractionary monetary 
policy for political ends, in much the same way that one would usually worry about the 
inappropriate use of expansionary monetary policy. 
Furthermore, the existence of divided government (that is, of one party 
controlling the presidency, while the other party controls one or both houses of Congress) 
raises the possibility that one party or the other could exploit a non-independent monetary 
policy to manufacture pre-election downturns as well as upturns.181 For example, in late 																																																								
179 See Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al, The Compleat Economic Voter: New Theory and British Evidence, 
43(2) BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 241 (Apr. 2013); RAY C. FAIR, PREDICTING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND 
OTHER THINGS (2d ed. 2011); Robert S. Erikson, Economic Conditions and The Presidential Vote, 83(2) 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (Jun. 1989); Gregory B. Markus, The Impact of Personal and National Economic 
Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis, 32(1) AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 137 
(1988).  
180 Ann Mari May, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, and the Carter Presidency, 23(4) PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q’LY 699, 708 (1993) (describing the “massive contraction” in “late 1979 and early 1980” due to 
Fed policy, which only turned expansionary in mid-1980, when it was too late to have much effect in time 
for the presidential election). 
181 The party that believed its opponents would be blamed for a weakening economy would have a 
motive to favor monetary contraction. Usually, the fate of the president’s party is thought to depend on the 
economy, which would give the other party’s congressional leaders reason to sink the economy. Where that 
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2010, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell famously said: “The single most important 
thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president.”182 There is 
some controversy over whether McConnell was saying baldly that he would oppose the 
president no matter what, or instead that he merely meant to say that enacting the 
Republicans’ substantive agenda was contingent on Obama’s losing his reelection bid in 
2012.183  Even on the more generous reading, however, the point is that McConnell 
wanted Obama to lose the next election. And if monetary policy had been under 
congressional control—even as a matter of creating stasis, as the Republicans succeeded 
in doing with regard to fiscal policy after 2010—the danger would have existed that 
monetary policy would also have been used to generate an unfavorable political 
environment for the president in 2012. 
Even in a world where the politicians currently favor tighter monetary policy than 
the Fed does, therefore, they could abuse non-independent monetary policymaking as a 
way to manipulate political outcomes. Although we view the pathological perspective as 
sufficient to justify an independent Fed even in an age of austerity, we also can see that 
the concern about self-dealing is justified even in the current environment. 
To say that the pathological perspective ultimately justifies Fed independence, 
however, is not to deny the value of an independent Fed in ordinary times. Here too we 
can usefully analogize to an independent judiciary. 
Various normative theories of judicial review extend to some but not all of the 
domain of judicial enforcement of the Constitution. For example, Jesse Choper has 
argued that judicial enforcement of the Constitution’s federalism and separation-of-
powers norms creates unnecessary friction with the political branches and that the courts 
should therefore spend their precious capital on protecting individual rights, where 
counter-majoritarianism finds its strongest justification.184 At the same time, however, 
Choper does not maintain that the courts act illegitimately when they enforce federalism 
and separation-of-powers norms.185 Likewise, even as he built a theory that justified 
judicial review to reinforce democracy and protect minority rights, Ely allowed that the 
courts can also enforce textual provisions that do neither.186 
In acknowledging that judicial review can be legitimately exercised across a 
broader range of cases than those that fall within its core justification, both Choper and 
Ely were recognizing a basic truth about law and institutions. Just as laws are necessarily 
over- and under-inclusive with respect to their background justifications, 187  so an 
institution may be designed with one purpose in mind, but peculiar features of that design 
allow it to function well—or poorly—in other settings. Where the design feature is 
is not the case, the president would have the motive to impose contractionary policies late in her term, 
rather than earlier, so that (by hypothesis), her political opponents in Congress pay the political price.  
182 Glenn Kessler, When Did McConnell Say He Wanted Obama to be a “One-Term President”?, WASH.
POST (Sep. 25, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/when-did-
mcconnell-say-he-wanted-to-make-obama-a-one-term-president/2012/09/24/79fd5cd8-0696-11e2-afff-
d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html (reprinting in full an interview originally published in the National Journal on 
October 23, 2012). 
183 See id. 
184 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 169—70 (1980). 
185 See id. at 381. 
186 See ELY, supra note 26, at 76 (accepting that “positive law has its claims, even when it doesn’t fit 
some grander theory”). 
187 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 25 (1991). 
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otherwise advantageous, we might borrow a term from architecture and call it a spandrel; 
where the design feature proves disastrous for some unanticipated reason we might 
borrow a term from literature and call it a Frankenstein’s monster.188 
In our view, the fact that the Fed has been able to minimize the damage done by 
insufficiently expansionary fiscal policy since the 2008 economic crisis through loose 
monetary policy is a happy accident—a byproduct of Fed independence that has been 
designed to serve a very different purpose. We recognize, however, that people who 
worry that the Fed’s “degrading” of the currency means that runaway inflation is just 
around the corner would regard the Fed’s use of its independence over the recent period 
as a very unhappy accident. 
If we shared the view of the economic austerians,189 we would worry that the 
recent tendency of the Fed to keep interest rates low calls into question the wisdom of 
continuing to allow the Fed to act independently. An austerian might still favor Fed 
independence, however, if she thought that its benefits in pathological circumstances 
outweighed the harms it inflicts when the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy is more 
expansionary (and thus, to an austerion, dangerous) than the monetary policy favored by 
political actors. That would be a complex predictive judgment, which could come out the 
other way. Because we are not austerians, however, to us the calculus looks quite 
different. The pathological perspective provides the “something extra” needed to justify 
Fed independence. The happy accident that in normal times Fed independence currently 
leads to better monetary policy than our era’s politics would otherwise appear to allow is 
simply an added bonus. 
C.  An Insider/Outsider Role 
In our view, the foregoing analysis suffices to justify Fed independence even in an 
age when political actors favor tight monetary policy. Nonetheless, we would call 
attention to one additional benefit of Fed independence that may be sufficiently 
substantial as to count as a freestanding justification for Fed independence. Because of 
the Fed’s status as a governmental entity that is not fully answerable to the political 
branches, it can act as a credible purchaser of government debt. As we described in detail 
in Part III, that is a useful function in ordinary times and a potentially economy-rescuing 
function during a crisis. 
As we have explained, in a liquidity crisis, a central bank serves the vital role of 
lender of last resort. In a sovereign debt crisis, a distinctly national central bank serves 
another function. Recent debt crises in Europe illustrate the point by negative example. 
Most prominently Greece—but also other countries struggling to repay sovereign debt—
would have a ready solution if they had borrowed in their own currency: They could 
simply increase the money supply, thereby devaluing the currency, and effectively 
188  Michael C. Dorf, Spandrel or Frankenstein’s Monster: The Vices and Virtues of Retrofitting in 
American Law, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV 339 (2012) (arguing that numerous features of American law 
currently serve purposes for which they were not originally devised). 
189 “Austerian” is a neologism for the view that tight monetary policy during an economic downturn will 
have a stimulative effect. It playfully combines “austerity” and “Austrian,” the latter in reference to 
“Austrian,” that is, Hayekian or anti-Keynesian, economics. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Bully for the Baltics?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 24, 2011), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/bully-for-the-baltics/ (arguing 
that austerian claims for success in Ireland, Latvia, and elsewhere are mistaken). 
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reducing the value of the debt to levels that could be repaid. To be sure, such a course 
carries its own rather serious risks, which partly explains why Greece has not (yet) 
simply abandoned the euro or exited the European Union (EU), but the decision to retain 
the euro and stay within the EU was undoubtedly influenced by other factors as well. 
First and most obviously, because Greece borrowed in euros, a return to and 
devaluation of the drachma would not by itself affect its debt level.190 A country with its 
own currency and central bank has the advantage of borrowing in its own currency, but 
once it has accumulated debt in another currency, switching to a national currency does 
not automatically convert the debt. Thus “Grexit”191 can only be accomplished by a 
default (or a negotiated haircut) on debt owed in euros, with an attendant increased cost 
of obtaining future credit.192 
Second, restarting a national currency would entail substantial transition costs. As 
soon as people learned of an impending currency shift, many of them would seek to 
withdraw their euros from Greek financial institutions before their money was converted 
into drachmas of uncertain and likely declining value. Bank runs would result. Indeed, 
something very much like this happened in Greece in the summer of 2015 when a Grexit 
began to be taken seriously as a possibility.193 
And finally, it appears that Greece faced the possibility of political and national 
security consequences if it abandoned the euro.194 Thus, the fact that no Grexit has (yet) 
occurred hardly shows that Greece would not have been better off had it never abandoned 
the drachma for the euro in the first place. 
The Greek case illustrates the value of a national central bank when a country 
desperately needs credit, but it does not show that the central bank must be independent. 
On the contrary, one might think that it shows the value of a central bank that does the 
bidding of the elected leaders of the government. From the Greek perspective, the 
problem with the European Central Bank in the current era is that it is too independent of 
the government of Greece. 
It does not follow, however, that a central bank should be subject to direct 
political control. For one thing, as we argued above, the pathological perspective 
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1436440251 (July 9, 2015). 
	 59	
warrants some degree of independence to address the structural risk of self-dealing. 
Moreover, even in a sovereign debt crisis, independence is valuable. 
Consider the debt-ceiling scenario we discussed in Part III. The immediate impact 
of a Fed policy of buying technically illegal bonds would be to enable the government to 
pay its bills and thus to avoid defaulting on its legal obligations; buying those bonds buys 
time for the political actors to come to their senses. 
But a Fed policy of buying such bonds would also have a second, arguably more 
important, impact. It would calm financial markets. Seeing the Fed purchasing the new 
bonds would reassure holders of existing (pre-crisis) bonds that their assets remain 
valuable. The policy would thus prevent a massive sell-off of Treasuries that would 
further raise the government’s cost of borrowing and might even threaten the status of the 
dollar as a reserve currency. 
Crucially, however, the Fed can only play this market-pacification role if the Fed 
is seen as a credible, responsible actor. Independence greatly strengthens that perception. 
Imagine how markets would react if a politically controlled central bank were to buy new 
bonds in a debt-ceiling crisis. Seeing that the administration’s “own” central bank was 
complicit in the issuance of debt-ceiling-violating bonds, markets would hardly be 
reassured of the real value of those bonds. Precisely because the actual Fed is insulated 
from political control, it can act as a credible counter-party to the government when the 
government issues debt. 
The point is easiest to see in a crisis, but it also holds true in ordinary times. As 
we explained above, money itself has no inherent value; it derives its value from the fact 
that everyone expects everyone else to treat it as valuable. 195 A central bank that acts 
independently of the political branches of government can credibly signal to the public 
that the money (whether in the form of currency or bonds) the government issues indeed 
has value. A central bank that is—and is therefore perceived as—a mere tool of the 
political branches of government can make no such commitment. 
Finally, the Fed’s political independence is also essential to allow it to fulfill its 
key function as the agency that adjusts monetary policy in response to the political 
branches’ changes in fiscal policy. A common view among economists is that, in normal 
times, the Fed should adjust monetary policy to offset the expansionary or contractionary 
effects of fiscal policy. For example, when politicians decide that it is a good idea to 
reduce annual deficits or to run surpluses and thus pay down some of the government’s 
debt, the associated government spending cuts or tax increases acting on their own would 
tend to shrink the economy. If the Fed has room to cut interest rates, however,196 it can 
prevent the economy from contracting in response to the fiscal consolidation. 
Crucially, if the Fed were not independent, it would be much more difficult to 
coordinate monetary and fiscal policies, and to guarantee to all relevant decision makers 
that the amount and timing of the offsetting policy changes will be carried out without 
political interference. But if the Fed can credibly guarantee to wavering members of 
Congress, who might otherwise worry that their votes for tax increases or spending cuts 
could result in job losses, knowing that monetary policy will be used to offset those 																																																								
195 See supra, text accompanying notes 43-50. 
196 It was precisely because the Fed had already cut interest rates to zero in 2008 that the fiscal austerity 
policies were so damaging in the U.S. and Europe. See Federal Reserve Press Release at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm (Dec. 16, 2008). 
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effects would make it easier to vote for fiscal contraction. Although there are plenty of 
situations in which particular tax increases or spending cuts might be unwise, the Fed’s 
ability to remove macroeconomic concerns from the conversation allows the political 
branches to discuss fiscal policy matters on their own merits. If, for example, the country 
were emerging from a severe recession in which the government had instituted fiscal 
measures that were intended to be temporary, the Fed’s independence would ease the 
transition back to normal operations, thus preventing otherwise unnecessary spending 
programs from becoming encrusted. 
Similarly, if the political branches were to determine that there should be a large 
increase in spending (for example, a multi-year program to rebuild the nation’s 
infrastructure), there might be serious concern that such an expansionary fiscal policy 
could generate inflation. Knowing that the Fed would prevent that from happening would 
again allow politicians to evaluate such a policy only on its merits or demerits. 
In short, even the political branches have good reason to want the Fed not to be a 
tool of those same political branches. Just as it is important to the health of the financial 
system (and ultimately, therefore, to the overall economy) that the public not view the 
Fed as being part of the political mix, it is important that the politicians themselves know 
that their decisions on fiscal policy will be paired with appropriately non-politicized 
monetary policy decisions. Only an independent Fed can credibly make such a guarantee. 
Conclusion 
In response to repeated market panics in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Congress created the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to serve as the nation’s 
central bank. The Fed’s core function is to be the “lender of last resort,” to intervene 
when market contagions create runs on banks and to counter other market pathologies 
that could, if unchecked, threaten the viability of the entire financial system and thus the 
economy. Because of the surpassing importance of that core function, Congress granted 
the Fed substantial independence in setting policy and in implementing the market 
interventions that it deems necessary. Being the lender of last resort, in turn, requires the 
Fed either to set monetary policy after a crisis has passed (to offset its actions during the 
crisis), or at least to coordinate with any other entity that Congress might endow with the 
power to set monetary policy (including Congress itself). Congress wisely chose to give 
the Fed that power directly. 
The Fed’s performance during and after the 2008 market collapse was exemplary. 
It was not only the Fed’s political independence that allowed it to succeed; in addition, its 
functional and perceived position as being “outside the government” allowed the Fed to 
calm the markets and rescue the economy from what could have become a second Great 
Depression. The extent of the Fed’s actions in the 2008 crisis, and the inability of any 
other public or private entity to intervene successfully in the crisis, made Congress’s 
decisions in setting up the Fed as a powerful entity freed from day-to-day political 
considerations look prescient. 
Nonetheless, the Fed’s recent actions have led to vituperative attacks on its 
independence. This is hardly the first time that the Fed or its predecessors have been 
targeted, but the current round of attacks has included extreme calls to inject political 
considerations into the Fed’s decision making and attempts to intimidate Fed decision 
61	
makers to set aside their own best judgment in favor of the Fed’s attackers’ policy 
preferences. 
In this article, we have argued that the Fed should not be rendered more directly 
accountable to political actors. The very real possibility of a near-future crisis that would 
be caused by the political branches’ failure to increase the federal debt ceiling shows how 
the Fed’s unique structure makes it the only actor that could minimize the damage in such 
a crisis, both because of the Fed’s ability to act as lender of last resort and its power to act 
exactly when needed. We also warn, however, that pushing the Fed into the role of last-
minute savior in such a crisis risks exposing it to accusations that it has taken sides in a 
political conflict. In proving that its political independence is essential, the Fed might 
endanger that very independence. 
Even if we are wrong about how that particular hypothetical crisis would play out, 
our broader goal is to explain how the Fed’s political independence enables it to act, 
during good times as well as bad, as an essential bulwark against policy making that 
would harm the financial system and the economy as a whole. We note that the Fed’s 
“insider-outsider” role provides the latitude for the Fed to take actions that would 
safeguard financial markets, whereas any other agency of government that tried to engage 
in those same actions would more likely fail (and possibly even make matters worse). 
In addition, drawing an analogy to the Article III judiciary, we argue that 
institutional independence is easiest to justify when it prevents the “ins” from abusing 
power for political advantage. We thus show that the Fed’s independence protects the 
public from politicians’ efforts to use the especially tempting levers of monetary policy to 
entrench themselves in power. We further argue that the Fed’s independence allows 
politicians to undertake policy initiatives with the knowledge that their actions will not be 
undermined by politically motivated activity at the Fed. In both good times and bad, 
therefore, an independent-but-ultimately-accountable Federal Reserve is an essential 
guardian of both the economy and the political system. 
